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The states are permitted to act unjustly only because the high-
est court in the land has, by its own will, moved the middle
ground and narrowed the nation’s power.1
The current Supreme Court has substantially expanded thescope of protection from lawsuits accorded to states by the
Eleventh Amendment and narrowed the exceptions to its appli-
cation.2  With rare exception, many people, including Indian
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1 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 156 (2002).
2 Judge and former law professor William Fletcher identifies three developments
responsible for the recent emergence of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence: adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “imposed substantial federal
constitutional obligations directly on the states”; the “Warren Court revolution,”
which “vigorous[ly] expand[ed] . . . equal protection and due process protections for
individuals against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment” and “set the stage”
for the “routine enforcement of affirmative injunctions against state actors under Ex
parte Young”; and “the expansion of federal statutory obligations imposed on the
states, both in cooperative and not-so-cooperative federalism.”  William A. Fletcher,
[47]
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tribes, federal employees, patent holders, the elderly, and the dis-
abled, find themselves unable to vindicate rights granted by fed-
eral laws in any court when the defendant is a state or a state
agency.3  The most recent example of this is the Court’s decision
in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority ,4 in which the Court extended the reach of the Elev-
enth Amendment to private administrative  enforcement actions
against states, thus forsaking completely any connection to the
text of the Amendment.5
This trend in the Court’s application of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to shield states from injured private citizens has potentially
ominous implications for citizens seeking to enforce federal envi-
ronmental mandates against states.6  States, as recipients of dele-
The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business , 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 846-
47 (2000).  He argues that the most important part of the Court’s “unfinished busi-
ness” is arriving at a proper understanding of the states’ place in the federal
structure.
3 That much of what is happening to undermine the effectiveness of federal man-
dates is taking place in the branch of government most insulated from public review
and accountability is also deeply troubling, as others have noted. See , e.g. , NOONAN,
supra  note 1, at 10, 156 (criticizing the Court for devising a standard based on an
“illusion” without a rationale “for its existence or a rationale to guide its expanded
application” and developing “[a] doctrine that has swelled beyond bounds . . . can-
not be consistently applied or reconciled with the federal system” and “is unjust”).
4 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
5 In Alden v. Maine , the Court referred to previous Eleventh Amendment cases,
stating, “[t]hese holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding . . . that sovereign
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution itself.”  527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).  The phrase “state sovereign
immunity” is “convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Elev-
enth Amendment.” Id . at 713. See  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-
68 (1997) (acknowledging “the broader concept of immunity implicit in the Consti-
tution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exem-
plifying”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996) (“[W]e long have
recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is ‘to strain
the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of,’”
quoting  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)); Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment
to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it con-
firms.”). See also  Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 857 (saying “all nine Justices have aban-
doned any thought, or any pretense, that the text of the Eleventh Amendment
matters”).
6 See, for example, Justice Breyer’s warning, in his dissent in College Savings
Bank , that Congress’s ability to allow a private remedy against a state as a water
polluter was now quite questionable.  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702-03 (1999); see also  David Milton Whalin, John
C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Envi-
ronmental Law After June 23, 1999 , 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 193 (2000).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 3  1-NOV-04 13:35
Effect of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits 49
gated federal regulatory authority, are important players in the
administration of many environmental laws.  States also own, op-
erate, and construct potentially polluting facilities like hazardous
waste landfills, hospitals, prisons, airports, roads, and sewage
treatment plants on state property that may violate federal laws.7
Thus, states are often targets of citizen suits.
Other factors magnify the significance of the Court’s state sov-
ereign immunity jurisprudence for environmental litigants.  First,
as Richard Lazarus has shown, the Supreme Court is generally
hostile towards environmental law, finding against environmen-
tal plaintiffs with rare exception.8  According to Oliver Houck,
the Court seems willing to use whatever constitutional provision
is at hand to find laws unconstitutional that promote environ-
mental protection.9  Thus, there is every reason to think that an
Whalin finds cause for concern in the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
with respect to the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act, the ability to sue
states as owners or operators of hazardous facilities under the Comprehensive
Emergency Response and Liability Act, and the legal sanctity of the Clean Air Act’s
(CAA) National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
7 Araiza makes the point that states as regulators that fail to implement or enforce
environmental laws adequately by causing spillover externalities on neighboring
states and their residents do more damage than the state as an operator of a single
polluting facility.  William D. Araiza, Alden v. Maine and the Web of Environmental
Law , 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1513, 1543 (2000).
8 See  Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the
Supreme Court , 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 619 (2002).  “[E]nvironmental protection
concerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored  role in influencing the Court’s
outcome,” which Lazarus attributes to the Justices’ “increasing skepticism of the
efficacy of environmental protection goals and the various laws that seek their pro-
motion.” Id . at 631 (emphasis added).  Lazarus notes in an update of his Pace arti-
cle that “the current Court, not withstanding its ‘conservative’ views, seems
especially ready to overturn the decisions of other branches within the federal sys-
tem,” and that its “stability” (due to the fact that the Court’s membership has not
changed since Breyer joined the Court in 1994) has enabled it to “systematically
grant review and decide cases that present the relevant legal issues in settings
favorable to the outcome that the majority seeks to promote.”  Richard J. Lazarus,
The Supreme Court: Three Years Later , 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 653-54 (2002);
see also  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“I have difficulty imagining this Court applying its rigid principles of
geographic formalism anywhere outside the context of environmental claims.”).
9 See  Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare , 19 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 675, 675-83 (2002).  Houck lists seven instances of the Court’s will-
ingness to use the Constitution, including the Court’s reconstruction of the Eleventh
Amendment, to strike down environmental laws, and compares the resulting mon-
tage to “watching a food fight.” Id . at 683.  The Court’s relatively recent decision in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers (SWANCC)  illustrates Professor Houck’s point about the Court’s willingness
to use the Constitution to strike at environmental protection initiatives.  531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001).  In SWANCC , the Court struck down the Corps’ “migratory bird
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Eleventh Amendment defense to a citizen suit under an environ-
mental law may fare well in this Court.  Second, the Court’s
evolving Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence occurs in a politi-
cal climate supportive of increased devolution to the states of
federal responsibilities for protecting the environment and de-
creased federal oversight of state performance,10 while at the
same time funds to perform both these tasks are diminishing.11
Third, there have been successful legal challenges to the agency’s
authority to overfile state enforcement initiatives,12 and to over-
rule,” under which the agency had regulated wetland fills in nonnavigable, isolated
wetlands, noting that there are “significant constitutional and federalism questions”
concerning Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate dredge and fill activi-
ties in isolated waters. Id.  “Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction
over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and
water use.” Id. But see  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 183-84 (2000) (holding plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits need not allege
and prove particularized environmental harm); Whitmore v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (rejecting the application of the nondelegation doctrine
to environmental regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-17 (2001) (narrowing the scope of Lucas per se  test
and exemplifying a more environmentally friendly Supreme Court).
10 More than seventy-five percent of the total number of major environmental
programs that can be delegated to, or assumed by, states have been so devolved.
Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health , 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351,
359 n.32 (2000).
11 See id.  at 377-78.
12 Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).  The Harmon  Court
found the EPA’s practice of overfiling in states where it has authorized the state to
act oversteps the federal agency’s authority under the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), saying:
While, generally speaking, two separate sovereigns can institute two sepa-
rate enforcement actions, those actions can cause vastly different and po-
tentially contradictory results.  Such a potential schism runs afoul of the
principles of comity and federalism so clearly embedded in the text and
history of the RCRA . . . .  In EPA authorized states, the EPA’s action is an
alternative method of enforcement that is permitted to operate only when
certain conditions are satisfied.
Id.  at 902. But see  United States v. Power Eng’g, 303 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to follow Harmon), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003); United States v.
LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (refusing to apply
Harmon  to the CAA, and noting that the statute contained language in its enforce-
ment section which seemed to anticipate overfiling).  Interestingly, as Steinzor
points out, five states filed amicus  briefs in Harmon  in support of the EPA’s overfil-
ing authority because depriving the agency of this power would increase pressure on
the EPA “to withdraw delegated authority over programs when it disagrees with a
state’s enforcement decisions.”  Steinzor, supra  note 10 at 359 n.31.  On the topic of
EPA overfiling, see generally Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement “Overfiling” in the Federal
Courts: Some Thought on the Post-Harmon Cases , 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 425 (2003).
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turn a state permit issued in violation of federal law,13 placing the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) state oversight au-
thority under a cloud.  This Article is about yet another potential
erosion of the network of laws that protect our environment—
the liability of states to citizens for violation of federal mandates.
An examination of the effect of the Court’s sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence on the private enforcement of environmental
laws against states, therefore, is no mere academic exercise.14  In
an atmosphere in which states are assuming a more central place
in the administration of federal environmental laws and federal
oversight of state performance is lessening, any initiative that in-
sulates states from legal challenge takes on grave significance for
environmental litigants.  If environmental plaintiffs cannot en-
force federally mandated standards and programmatic require-
ments against the states that run these programs, history advises
that states may under-perform.15  Thus, a reinvigorated Eleventh
13 Alaska Dep’t Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2002),
aff’d , 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) (holding that the EPA acted within its authority under
the Clean Air Act when it overturned the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation’s issuance of a permit to a mine that did not require implementation of
best available control technology).  The state argued in its certiorari  petition that the
Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates permitting decisions to the states, and that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision is in conflict with the decisions by the Court and other fed-
eral appeals courts that establish the division between federal and state jurisdiction
under the CAA and other similar laws.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion, and while not responding specifically to the state’s arguments
raised in its certiorari  petition on the division of the federal-state authority under the
CAA, the Court did say “[i]t would be unusual, to say the least, for Congress to
remit a federal agency enforcing federal law solely to state court.”  124 S. Ct. 983,
1004 (2004).
14 See  United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 45-46 (1992).  In his dis-
sent, Justice Stevens referred to the Court’s holding that section 106(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not waive immunity from an action seeking monetary recovery in
a bankruptcy proceeding, saying “[t]he cost to litigants, to the legislature, and to the
public at large, of this sort of judicial lawmaking is substantial and unfortunate.  Its
impact on individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is tragic.”
See also  Randall S. Abate & Carolyn H. Cogswell, Sovereign Immunity and Citizen
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws: A Proposal for a New Synthesis , 15
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1995).  The authors explain that shielding federal pollution facili-
ties from citizen suits is unnecessary, because Congress has limited both the circum-
stances under which citizen suits may be brought and the remedies citizens can
receive. Id . at 7.  Further, doing this will cause substantial injustice because it will
move controversies from the courts, which are well-suited to resolve them, to ill-
equipped administrative forums that lack procedural safeguards. Id .
15 See  Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 399-419 (describing how the states are falling
behind in their capacity to respond to “first-generation environmental problems”);
see also  John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act , 54 MD.
L. REV. 1183, 1208-16 (1995) (describing the EPA’s tepid enforcement efforts
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Amendment applied to citizen suits brought to enforce federal
environmental laws can as effectively undercut the impact of
those laws as if Congress had amended them to achieve the same
result.16
This Article focuses on the impact of the Court’s Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence on citizen suits authorized under the
Clean Water Act (CWA),17 because that law’s cooperative feder-
alism structure is typical of many other environmental laws, and
because citizen suits have historically played a critical role in its
implementation.  The CWA’s citizen suit provision (section
505),18 which specifically incorporates the Eleventh Amendment,
has brought on citizen suits the full force and effect of the
Court’s current state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.19  The
prevailing wisdom is that the Court’s state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence will not bar CWA citizen suits brought to enforce
federal mandates against states in federal court.  For the reasons
set out in this Article, I am not sure I agree.
The structure of the Article is straightforward.  The Article
briefly discusses the importance of private enforcement of the
CWA, the law’s structure, and the specific language of section
505.  It then summarizes the arguments favoring centralization of
regulatory authority in the federal government and shows how
arguments favored by devolutionists—those who argue for de-
centralization of federal regulatory authority to the states—ap-
pear to be prevailing to the detriment of strong environmental
enforcement.  The Article then turns to the key cases that com-
prise the Court’s current view of the Eleventh Amendment.  An
examination of this case law reveals the compatibility between
the themes the devolutionists propound and those the Court ar-
ticulates in support of its decisions.  The Article applies this
against recalcitrant states regarding inspection and maintenance programs under the
CAA).
16 Until the recent decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw , 528 U.S. 167
(2000), the Court’s standing jurisprudence was having the same effect. See also
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine , 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 84 n.194 (2000) (noting that under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has invali-
dated twenty-four acts of Congress) (cited in NOONAN, supra  note 1, at 192).
17 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
18 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000).
19 The incorporation of the Eleventh Amendment into the specific text of section
505 also defeats any argument that might be made that the authorization of private
rights of action under the law abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity. See infra
Part III.
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decentrist jurisprudence, as interpreted by the lower courts, to
the CWA to see to what extent it might constrain citizen suits
against states, and concludes that it might well limit them.  Fi-
nally, the Article shows how various suggested ways around the
Eleventh Amendment, such as finding an alternative theory for
congressional abrogation or grounds for states to waive their im-
munity, relying on the federal sovereign to prosecute CWA viola-
tions against states, or relying on the state courts to vindicate
these rights, are wanting in some respect, and thus are poor sub-
stitutes for citizen suits.  Since the Court has taken upon itself to
reinvent the Eleventh Amendment, only the Court can restore
the proper balance between the federal government and the
states.  One can only hope that it will choose to do this before it
succeeds in undermining the effectiveness of some very impor-
tant federal environmental laws.
I
THE FEDERALISM STRUCTURE OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT AND THE ROLE OF CITIZENS
IN THE ACT’S IMPLEMENTATION
Congress in the 1970s and 1980s enacted a series of laws that
largely, but not exclusively, centralized environmental regulation
in the federal government.20  This was done in response to the
failure of a completely decentralized regime to abate air and
water pollution and to respond to both its spillover effects and
the effects of competition between states to attract industry.21
20 The previous decentralized regime consisted initially of nuisance law, followed
by municipal ordinances in the late nineteenth century and eventually by some state
pollution control laws in the 1950s and 1960s. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72-77 (3d. ed. 2000)
(describing the origins of modern environmental law).
21 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism , 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
601-02 (1996); see also  William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Con-
trol in the United States—States, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I , 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 196-99 (2003) (commenting that state regulatory efforts in
the 1950s to mid-1960s were “too little, too late”).  Esty also notes that there were
other forces that spurred centralization of environmental regulation, such as the
preference of some industries “for unified national standards that would preempt
varying state requirements” and presidential politics.  Esty, supra  at 602.  With re-
gard to the latter, Esty singles out former Senator Ed Muskie, a leading Senate en-
vironmentalist, whose 1972 presidential campaign against President Richard Nixon
helped ensure that a strong CAA moved through Congress. Id.  at 602-03; see also
Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 366-75 (listing as justifications for a centralized regulatory
regime: mastery of the complex technical and scientific challenges of effective pollu-
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The inability of states to withstand local political pressures also
contributed to the states’ poor performance in regulating envi-
ronmental pollution.  Each of these laws employs a model of fed-
eralism that defines, somewhat imprecisely, the contours of the
relationship between the federal and state governments in the
law’s administration.  The effect of the Court’s Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence on the federalism model employed by the
CWA is the focus of this Article.
A. The Federalism Structure of the CWA
There are different federalism models, under which states play
a role in the administration of the nation’s environmental and
natural resources laws.22  The CWA, like other pollution control
laws, uses what I have called elsewhere the state primacy, or dual
regulation cooperative federalism model.23  Under this model,
the EPA administratively delegates its authority to the states to
issue standards and administer and enforce the law’s permitting
tion control; mitigation of the damage caused by transboundary pollution; achieve-
ment of “distributive justice” in the maintenance of public health among the citizens
of the United States; and the likelihood that states will engage in a “race-to-the-
bottom” that weakens environmental protection); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy , 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-19 (1977) (adding to the congres-
sional rationales in support of centralizing authority in the federal government more
academic reasons, such as the need to address the tragedy of the commons and
achieve national economies of scale, overcome disparities in effective political repre-
sentation, correct market failures arising from pollution externalities, and to obtain
the advantages of pursuing moral ideals and the politics of sacrifice on a national
plane). See  Esty, supra  at 603-05 (discussing Stewart’s contribution to centralization
debate).
22 See generally  Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management,
or Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save
Our Private Lands , 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 193 (1996) (describing
three models of cooperative federalism and comparing them to the dominant federal
model in use on the nation’s public lands).
23 Id.  at 199.  Dwyer describes three features of this model as used in the CAA:
Congress (1) “made the major policy decisions or assigned them to the EPA,” while
leaving the states “considerable room to build upon policy decisions from which
they are nominally excluded”; (2) “delegated substantial implementation and en-
forcement authorities to the states if they want them and are willing to conform their
regulatory programs to minimal federal criteria,” leaving to the states the important
task of “filling in the details”; and (3) “adopted mechanisms to coerce state coopera-
tion without directly taking over state legislative and administrative bodies,” includ-
ing placing a high cost on a state exercising the “exit option”—loss of “state control
of [its] air pollution control program and related land use and economic decisions.”
Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1197-99.
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requirements through federally approved state programs.24  The
states with approved regulatory programs are eligible to receive
federal funds to offset the costs of administering these pro-
grams.25  If the state regulatory program meets some standard of
comparability with its federal analog, state laws, state agencies,
and state courts replace their federal counterparts.26  To assure
no relaxation in implementation of the federal law’s require-
ments, the EPA oversees state performance of its delegated au-
thority,27 and retains authority to reassert federal jurisdiction,28
restrict or condition federal funding of state programs to achieve
specific programmatic results,29 or enforce directly if the agency
deems state performance deficient.30  Unless states enact their
own independent laws and replace federal funding, the state
agencies administering delegated programs must satisfy their fed-
eral overseers.31
24 The Framers of the Constitution shared the assumption that sovereignty was
“unitary and exclusive . . . capable neither of division nor of joint tenancy” and,
therefore, either the “state legislatures or national Congress [had] to predominate.”
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law , 79 VA. L. REV. 633,
654 (1993).  During the course of their debates the framers grew to accept the idea
that both the central (national) government and the states could exercise sover-
eignty in their separate  spheres. Nonetheless, the Framers might have been puzzled
by this sharing  of regulatory power with the states. Id.  at 654-56.
25 See , e.g. , Clean Water Act (CWA) § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994).  This section
of the CWA grants states and interstate agencies funds “to assist them in administer-
ing programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, including
enforcement directly or through appropriate State law enforcement officers or
agencies.”
26 See , e.g. , CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (stating that states may not adopt
or enforce standards which are “less stringent than” federal standards).
27 See , e.g. , CWA § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1994) (requiring federal review
of state-issued national pollution discharge elimination system permits).
28 See , e.g. , CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994) (setting out the criteria for
withdrawal of federal approval of state national pollution discharge elimination sys-
tem permit programs).
29 CWA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994) (authorizing the conditioning of, or reduc-
tion in, federal program grants); CAA § 179(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (1994) (author-
izing the cutoff of federal highway funds in nonattainment areas).  For a more
complete list of the coercive sticks in the CAA, see Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1196-
97.
30 CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1994) (authorizing federal enforcement of
state administered permitting programs).
31 For a description of the delegation program under pollution control laws, the
EPA’s authority for withdrawing delegated authority, and the power of citizens to
petition for program withdrawal, see generally Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 357-59.
As Steinzor notes, “[t]he potent dichotomy between the usual prerogatives of state
executives and legislators and this dependence on relatively remote federal officials
cannot help but breed tension and resistance.” Id.  at 359. Cf.  Richard B. Stewart,
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Given the fact that Congress enacted laws like the CWA in
response to, among other factors, state and local neglect of envi-
ronmental problems and local entrenchment of privilege, it is
puzzling that Congress picked a federalism model that returns to
the states substantial regulatory authority over pollution control
and abatement.  After all, had Congress selected a completely
centralized water pollution regulatory program, it would have
certainly avoided these errors of the past.  A centralized regime
would have also corrected market failures and lessened inequi-
ties among states as well as possible industry forum-shopping.32
However, even discounting the obvious political attractiveness
to Congress of the federalism model it selected, sharing imple-
mentation authority with the states made, and to a large degree
still makes, sense.33 Giving states authority to administer the
law’s regulatory programs moves decisions to where regulated
Madison’s Nightmare , 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 352-53 (1990) (recommending the use
of indirect methods, such as transferable pollution credits, to achieve the desired
“strategic coupling” of the institution’s decisions with national norms and goals).
32 See  Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to
the States , 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1299-1300 (1995) (noting the particular importance
of this feature in the field of pollution control where the concern is that the absence
of a strong federal presence will result in “an uneven playing field dotted with ‘pol-
lution havens’”).  The rationales for centralization, according to Dwyer, are “to take
advantage of economies of scale with regard to research and data collection, to regu-
late interstate pollution, and to replace unduly weak state regulation.”  Dwyer,
supra  note 15, at 1219 (citing Stewart, supra  note 21, at 1211-19).  Dwyer also cites
excerpts from the CAA’s legislative history to show Congress’s concern about the
willingness of states to relax environmental standards to attract, or keep, economic
development. Id . at 1195 n.60. But see  Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environ-
mental Regulation , 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1219 (1992) (disputing the existence of
industry forum-shopping and the race-to-the-bottom).
33 See generally  Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1190 (saying that “[a]lthough the states
are by no means equal partners in regulating the environment, they paradoxically
remain indispensable partners” because “the federal government needs state bu-
reaucracies (with their technical and administrative resources) and state politicians
(with their political and budgetary support) to achieve its environmental goals”); see
also id.  at 1216-19 (describing the “inevitability of state autonomy in environmental
law” because environmental regulation affects “areas—such as land use control and
protection of public health and natural resources—that have been in the domain of
state and local agencies for decades”; “the diversity of local conditions” requires that
implementation and enforcement of federal standards be tailored to local condi-
tions, which, in turn, requires local decision makers who are both knowledgeable
and sympathetic toward these conditions, and the controversial nature of environ-
mental law makes local political support important); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism , 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1994) (stating that the “law that most
affects most people in their daily lives is still overwhelmingly state law”).
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activities occur, which allows permits to be tailored to local con-
ditions and to be informed by better, site-specific information.
Using a federalism model in which states play a key role in the
law’s regulatory programs reflects the fact that the country’s size
and geographic diversity and the number of regulated entities
make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer the
CWA’s permitting program from Washington (or even from the
EPA’s regional offices).34  The model also respects the close rela-
tionship between pollution and land use, long considered a pre-
rogative of local government,35 as well as the fact that the federal
government’s resources are limited, and that the states have had
considerable experience administering laws of this type.  Thus, in
theory, the model’s federalism design should lead to more effi-
cient use of limited resources and ultimately enhance the legiti-
macy and efficacy of regulatory decisions.  Unfortunately, quite
the contrary has been true, and the problems with the model set
forth below have fueled cries for even greater devolution of regu-
latory responsibility to the states.36
A fundamental flaw in the CWA’s cooperative federalism
model is its dependence on a synthesis of two inherently conflict-
ing goals: state regulatory primacy and the implementation of
federal standards.37  A governance design in which one jurisdic-
34 See  Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1197-98.  Slightly over a decade ago, the EPA
collected information under various federal pollution control laws about more than
30,000 abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, and 328 toxic chemicals
released to the air, water, and land from more than 17,000 manufacturing facilities.
The EPA also has a database for water quality information alone that contains over
170 million data points on surface and groundwater quality, sediments, streamflow,
and fish tissue contamination, which provides information on which regulatory pro-
grams principally administered by the states are based. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:
THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 260-61 (1992).
35 See  James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerg-
ing New Model for State Growth Management Statutes , 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
489, 493 (1994) (saying the “dominant model of land use regulation” in this country
is local control of land use through Euclidean zoning).
36 Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 375-77 (describing “tensions in the [federal-state]
marriage” and the pressures to dissolve the arrangement).
37 See  Babcock, supra  note 22, at 200-02 (describing the problems with the state
primacy, dual regulation model of cooperative federalism); see also  Steinzor, supra
note 10 at 375-77 (describing the downward spiral in federal state relations under
this model).  For other failings of the state primacy, or dual regulation, model, see
Babcock, supra  note 22, at 202-03; cf . William M. Eichbaum & Hope M. Babcock, A
Question of Delegation: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
and State-Federal Relations,  86 DICK. L. REV. 615 (1982) (describing the tension in
the Surface Mining Act between congressionally mandated detailed performance
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tion takes the lead in developing the policies that another juris-
diction has primary responsibility for implementing—i.e., a
design that “deputizes the states to enforce the law on an equal
footing with EPA but gives the Federal government superior lev-
erage within the relationship”38—is bound to cause conflict.
Similarly, a model based on inherent federal distrust of state per-
formance, reflected in the model’s concentric, overlapping
power-sharing structure, can only lead to strained relationships
between the governing partners.39
Complaints about state-run pollution abatement and control
programs continue under the new regime.40  Although some
states have surpassed the federal government in their zeal to pro-
tect the environment,41 this is not true for many others.42  For the
standards and a cooperative federal-state relationship). But see  Dwyer, supra  note
15, at 1219 (describing “the tension between federal and state priorities” under envi-
ronmental laws as promoting “the development and growth of states as environmen-
tal policy-makers”).
38 Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 359.
39 See generally  Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1199-1219 (describing the ebb and flow
in the federal-state relationship embodied in the CAA as illustrated by the EPA’s
efforts to impose mandatory land use and transportation controls and its enforce-
ment against states that refused to implement inspection and maintenance pro-
grams); E. Donald Elliott, Federal Versus State Environmental Protection Standards:
Can a National Policy Be Implemented Locally?,  22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,010 (1992);
Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Lo-
cal Air Pollution Variances , 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 255 (1993); GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-95-64, EPA AND THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP (1995) [hereinafter
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE]. But see  Houck & Rolland, supra  note 32, at 1312
(finding positive features of this conflict in the administration of the federal wet-
lands permitting program).
40 The 1998 EPA Inspector General’s Report found widespread failures by states
to enforce the laws or to report violations to the EPA, and that the EPA had been
lax in supervising state enforcement.  John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA and State Found to
be Lax on Pollution Laws , N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at A1; Eric Pianin, GAO Issues
Warning on EPA Enforcement; Plan to Shift Resources Criticized , WASH. POST, Aug.
23, 2001, at A23 (reporting that the EPA’s Office of Inspector General found only a
handful of states had aggressive environmental enforcement programs and that it
criticized the performance of forty-four states in enforcing CWA standards); Mel-
nick & Willes, supra  note 39, at 253-54 (1993) (noting that state and local air districts
were “reluctant to enact stringent environmental regulation” because of local eco-
nomic concerns).  Even the Administration’s Proposed Budget for FY 2004 notes
that, in recent years, authorized state NPDES programs have been the object of an
increasing number of withdrawal petitions, citizen lawsuits, and independent reviews
“indicating noncompliance with Federal CWA requirements,” citing in particular
problems with the timely issuance of NPDES permits. TEXT SUPPLEMENT, ADMINIS-
TRATION’S PROPOSED BUDGET FOR FY 2004, 2-6 (Feb. 7, 2003).
41 See , e.g. , CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1986) (requiring
businesses to warn persons exposed to listed carcinogens or reproductive toxins); id.
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most part, states lack the resources and political will to be tough
regulators.43  At the same time, allegations of inconsistent fed-
eral oversight and micromanagement of state programs, wasteful
duplication of effort, delayed and conflicting decisions, and lack
of finality have burdened the CWA cooperative federalism
model almost to the point of disability.44  Further, the political
unpopularity of the federal oversight “sticks” (e.g., withdrawal of
enforcement or broader programmatic authority) and limited
federal resources supporting their use means that federal over-
sight is uneven and often ineffective.  These factors curtail the
federal government’s capacity to counter-balance excessive state
responsiveness to local political and economic pressure.  This
puts at risk the model’s ability to achieve national norms and
avoid distributional inequities among the several states, thus un-
dermining the theoretical advantages of the model set out
previously.
B. The Clean Water Act’s Citizen Suit Provision
Congress recognized that deputizing private citizens to enforce
the CWA was essential for achieving the Act’s goal of
§§ 39650-39675 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (requiring emission standards for toxic air
contaminants); id.  §§ 44300-44394 (requiring facilities to submit an inventory of
toxic emissions, to prepare and publicly release a health risk assessment, and to im-
plement measures to reduce air emissions); New York v. EPA, Docket No. 02-1387
(D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 6, 2003) (discussing nine northeastern states that have sued the
EPA over alleged changes in the CAA’s new source review provisions that weaken
the program’s effectiveness); Carolyn Whetzel, South Coast District Adopts Strictest
Rule in United States on Hexavalent Chromium , 34 ENVTL. REP. May 9, 2003, at
1083.
42 Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 357-58 (noting that nearly half the states have passed
laws preventing state agencies from implementing more stringent standards than
those promulgated by the EPA “largely in response to the demands of regulated
industries”).
43 See  Steinzor, supra  note 10.
44 See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra  note 39. Another area
where these problems are seen is in state enforcement of federal pollution control
mandates where state inspectors seek more flexibility and accommodation of local
interests than do their federal counterparts; see  Melnick & Willes, supra  note 39, at
235 (saying federal agencies must walk a narrow line between federal mandates that
specifically disallow local considerations and the states’ desire for flexibility); James
R. Elder, Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its Obligations or Can the
States Better Meet Water Quality Challenges? , in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NA-
TIONAL POLICY BE IMPLEMENTED LEGALLY 20 (1990) (describing the “EPA’s tight-
rope walk between the need for national consistency and state flexibility in
implementation”).
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“[r]estoration and maintenance of [the] chemical, physical and
biological integrity [of the] Nation’s waters.”45  Courts have con-
sistently recognized this fact of legislative intent,46 although rec-
ognizing at the same time that citizen enforcement of the Act was
only supplemental to the enforcement role of the government.47
This is not to say that granting private enforcement authority to
citizens is without controversy—it is not.48  But few dispute that
citizen-initiated litigation has had a profound impact on the
shape of environmental law.49  The workhorse of citizen suit liti-
gation is section 505 of the CWA.  Nearly every environmental
law contains a provision like that found in section 505.50  Na-
45 CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). See  Jefferson D. Reynolds, Defanging
Environmental Law: Extracting Citizen Suit Provisions Under  Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 79-80 (1996-1997) (discussing the
legislative history of the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, and noting with
respect to the Endangered Species Act that by the time that law was enacted, “the
concept of citizen enforcement was well received with little attention in the congres-
sional record”).
46 See , e.g. , Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973)
(saying, “[t]he public suit seems particularly instrumental to the statutory scheme . . .
for only the public—certainly not the polluter—has the incentive to complain if the
EPA falls short . . . .”); see also  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972)
(referring to a citizen who sues under an environmental citizen lawsuit provision as a
“private attorney general”); accord Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
47 See , e.g. , Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,
60 (1987) (saying “[t]he bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action
is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to
supplant governmental action”); see also S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted
in  1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730 (“The Committee intends the great volume of en-
forcement actions be brought by the State,” and citizen suits are proper only “if the
Federal, State , and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility
. . . .”) (emphasis added); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 271 (2d
ed. 1994) (discussing the fact that the sixty-day notice requirement in the citizen suit
provision of the CWA was constructed in a way “‘to encourage and provide for
agency enforcement’”) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971)).
48 Cf.  Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law ,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982).  Sunstein lists some of the reasons that implied pri-
vate rights of action  under environmental laws are not a good idea.  Among other
reasons, they “require courts to undertake determinations for which they lack the
specialized factfinding and policymaking competence of the relevant agency.” Id.  at
416.  Decentralized courts increase the likelihood that enforcement process will not
be consistent or coordinated, creating “varied results and unpredictability for the
regulator and regulated,” and “collective benefits are typically better protected
through public enforcement mechanisms than through private remedies.”  Abate &
Cogswell, supra  note 14, at 31-32.
49 See  David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental
Law , 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 727, 736 (2002) (attributing to environmental litiga-
tion not only the modern shape of environmental laws, but also their initial passage).
50 See , e.g. , Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d),
2619(c)(2) (2004); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C.
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tional, regional, and local environmental organizations as well as
ad hoc groups and individuals concerned about a particular re-
source or potential environmental harm have found their way to
court to try and enforce federal mandates under those
provisions.51
Section 505 of the CWA authorizes citizens to file suit against
either the Administrator of the EPA for failing to perform a non-
discretionary duty or against:
any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged
to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or
a State with respect to such a standard or limitation.52
The CWA defines “person” as “an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State , municipality, commission, or po-
litical subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.”53  The refer-
§ 1540(g)(4) (2004); Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1970 § 520, 30
U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2004); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30
U.S.C. § 1427(c) (2004); Marine Protection Research & Sanctuaries Act § 105(g)(4),
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2004); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 16(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1515(d) (2004); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (2004);
Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d); Energy Sources Develop-
ment Act § 210(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 5851(e)(2) (2004); Energy Policy & Conservation
Act § 335(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (2004); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2004); Clean Air Act §§ 304, 307, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607(f)
(2004); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act § 725(d), 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d) (2004);
Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act § 114(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (2004);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42
U.S.C. § 9659 (2004); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a)(5), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(a)(5) (1994).
51 See  Sive, supra  note 49, at 735-36 (calling groups such as Earthjustice, Natural
Resource Defense Council, and Environmental Defense Fund “Environmental Pub-
lic Interest Law Firms”) (citing RODGERS, supra  note 47, at 909-27).  Rodgers
showed that NRDC has brought fifty-five cases, EDF (now Environmental Defense
or ED) forty-eight cases, Sierra Club (most brought by Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund, now EarthJustice) seventy-nine cases, and National Wildlife Federation eigh-
teen cases; Sive said that when all the cases brought by other individuals, organiza-
tions and ad hoc  groups are added to those cases, nearly two-thirds of the cases
listed by Rodgers are statutorily authorized citizen suits.
52 CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). See also
CWA § 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (setting the parameters for citizen suits
seeking administrative penalties).
53 CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1994) (emphasis added).  Each of the
governmental terms (i.e., “State,” “municipality,” and “interstate agency”) is further
defined to make clear Congress’s intent with regard to the reach of section 505. See
CWA § 502(2), (3), (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1562(2), (3), (4) (1994), respectively. See also
CWA § 502(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1562(1) (1994) (defining “State water pollution control
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ence to the Eleventh Amendment in section 505(a) is where
citizen suits quite literally enter into the interpretative fray over
the intent of that Amendment,54 even though there is a specific
authorization for citizens to sue states.
Until recently, the major hurdle facing environmental plaintiffs
was meeting the Court’s Article III standing requirements.55
With the advent of the Court’s state sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence, another potentially disabling barrier to these suits has ap-
peared.  The problems with the CWA’s cooperative federalism
model, and the pressures on the EPA to devolve even greater
agency” as meaning the “State agency designated by the Governor having responsi-
bility for enforcing State laws, relating to the abatement of pollution”).
54 Somewhat surprisingly there has been little litigation over the meaning of that
reference, and what case law has developed, for the most part, finds no abrogation
of sovereign immunity. See infra  notes 105-06 and accompanying text; note 188.
One court explained “the dearth of cases” interpreting “‘to the extent permitted
by’” language in section 505 of the CWA as being due to the fact that state, like
federal, enforcement actions are not subject to suit because of their discretionary
nature.  Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
55 See , e.g. , Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106-10 (1998)
(finding a citizen suit seeking declaratory relief and civil penalties did not meet the
redressibility prong of Article III standing); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523
U.S. 726, 732-34 (1998) (finding citizens who challenged the land and natural re-
sources management plan for Ohio’s Wayne National Forest had not suffered a
“practical harm” and, therefore, the lawsuit was not ripe for judicial review because
site-specific environmental assessments were required before any logging could oc-
cur); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (requiring claims not authorized under a
citizen suit provision to meet a zone-of-interest test); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (applying a particularized injury rule of Article III stand-
ing even to cases where Congress had specifically authorized suit); Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891-92 (1990) (holding that citizens challenging agency
action must allege highly particularized injuries, and questioning constitutional va-
lidity of lawsuits asserting programmatic violations).  The Court has also erected
other jurisdictional hurdles for potential environmental litigants to clear. See , e.g .,
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding the notice requirement
in citizen suits provisions is jurisdictional); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 58-61 (1987) (holding citizen suits can be filed only
where an ongoing violation continues when the lawsuit is filed, and disallowing suits
for wholly past violations).  Congress partially overruled Gwaltney  in the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act, allowing citizen lawsuits for past violations if
there was evidence that they had been repeated.  Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2683
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1990)).  A pause in this negative
trend for citizen plaintiffs occurred in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services , 528 U.S. 167 (2000), which granted standing to a citizen group that had
alleged a less particularized injury than in Lujan I  and allowed suit for both declara-
tory relief and civil penalties. See also  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1523-24 (saying that
“the skepticism the Court has shown about citizen standing percolates into Alden ’s
grant of immunity to the states,” that both doctrines “converge at the point of im-
posing structure-based limits on private law enforcement,” and “[i]n both situations
the Court has reserved enforcement power to a government entity”).
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regulatory authority on the states despite these problems, make
citizen enforcement of pollution control laws against states even
more essential today and magnify the impact of this barrier on
environmental law.56
II
THE RISE OF THE STATES UNDER
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Within the CWA’s cooperative federalism model, there is con-
siderable discretion as to how the balance between the federal
government and states should be struck.  During early implemen-
tation of laws like the CWA, the tilt was towards the federal gov-
ernment.  Since the Reagan Administration and the
congressional “Contract With America,”57 the tilt has been to-
wards the states.58  Whatever support there once was for centrist
thinking has long given way to proponents of decentralism.59
56 See  Eric Pianin, For Environmentalists, Victories in Court: Groups Turn to Judi-
cial System to Fight Efforts By Bush Administration to Relax Protections , WASH.
POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A3 (describing how, faced with “diminished political influ-
ence at the White House and on Capital Hill, environmental groups increasingly and
successfully are turning to the courts for help in blocking efforts to relax or scrap
environmental protection”).
57 Much of this thinking at the political level has had a decidedly anti-Washington
and anti-bureaucracy slant. See , e.g, . NEWT GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9
(1995) (“We must replace our centralized, micromanaged, Washington-based bu-
reaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system more appropriate to a continent-
wide country . . . . ‘Closer is better’ should be the rule of thumb . . . .”), as quoted in
Esty, supra  note 21, at 610 n.148; Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1219 (quoting former
Governor Pete Wilson explaining his state’s resistance to federally mandated motor
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, and Wilson’s saying “[w]e’re the ones
who breathe our air, not the Federal bureaucrats in Washington.”).  Tarlock com-
ments on the deep passions that the “decentering” of government triggers, with
those on the right supporting devolution “in the name of an arid, abstract federalism
often divorced from how power is actually exercised, shared and constrained,” while
environmentalists fiercely oppose it “as a disguised effort to roll back thirty plus
years of environmental protection.”  A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental
“Rule of Law” Litigation and There Is One , 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 611, 613
(2002).
58 See generally , Esty, supra  note 21, at 599-613 (describing briefly this history and
the rationales used by both the proponents of centralization and of decentraliza-
tion).  For an impressive list of academic scholars who have opined on the preferred
location for the administration and enforcement of environmental laws, see
Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 356 n.20, 360-63 (2000) (discussing not only the historical
evolution toward centralization of authority to administer and enforce environmen-
tal laws, but also the competing subtexts at work in the debate over the contours of
the state primacy regulatory model).
59 Esty calls this “second-generation thinking,” as opposed to the thinking of the
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Rena Steinzor demonstrates this trend in her article, Devolution
and the Public Health , in which she describes some of the initia-
tives under the EPA’s reinvention program that devolve greater
responsibility to the states and restrain even further the EPA’s
oversight role.60  Both of these initiatives are occurring within
the CWA’s existing federalism framework.
It is not necessary to go into detail with respect to any of the
specific reinvention proposals to realize that the devolution trend
they reflect is troubling because of the fundamental problems
with the CWA’s cooperative federalism model set out previously.
Steinzor reaffirms this concern with her four “cautionary tales,”
which illustrate the perils of greater devolution to the states.61
Each of these tales, not surprisingly, stems directly from experi-
ence with the CWA.  They are:  (1) the growing problem in the
implementation of the CWA’s industrial permitting program
where states are seriously behind in repermitting existing dis-
chargers; (2) the difficulties states have had in issuing water qual-
ity standards (a power given to the states to tailor national
effluent limitations to local conditions);62 (3) a dramatically dif-
ferent view of enforcement as an incentive to good regulatory
performance tending towards cooperative solutions to violations,
as opposed to viewing enforcement primarily as a means to pun-
first generation that authored the original laws.  Esty, supra  note 21, at 605.  Esty
also lists among commonly used arguments supporting decentralization the fact that
it brings the “benefits of diversity” (i.e., states functioning as laboratories) and cor-
rects the diseconomies of regulatory scale (i.e., the benefit of “tailoring” regulations
to the localized circumstances of environmental background conditions, risk prefer-
ences, policy preferences, income levels, and improving social welfare). Id.  at 606-
13.  In addition, decentralization increases regulatory competition without resulting
in a race-to-the-bottom, offers more representative decision making, and counters
the likelihood of regulatory powers being captured by “rent-seeking interests or
other narrowly focused groups” who impose costs on society. Id.  at 611. See also
John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law ,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 365-66 (2002) (commenting on the largely “unnoticed
trend” among local governments to adopt environmentally protective laws, arguing
that local governments should be “full partners of the state and federal governments
in the critical matter of environmental protection,” and advocating that federal and
state policy should be changed “to reinforce and utilize this powerful new grass-
roots force”).
60 Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 420-46 (describing and critiquing the EPA’s reinven-
tion initiatives, including state mini-block grants and a system of differential EPA
oversight of state performance, because they devolve greater, unsupervised regula-
tory authority on states).
61 Id.  at 382-99.
62 CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2004) (authorizing states to
develop water-quality-based effluent limits).
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ish violators with stiff penalties;63 and (4) the difficulties states
have had combating transboundary pollution.64  Steinzor con-
cludes that the states are falling behind in their capacity to re-
spond to even first generation environmental problems under the
CWA, and are in no position to tackle second generation
problems by any means, innovative or otherwise—referring to
some of the EPA’s reinvention devolution initiatives.65  For those
concerned about environmental protection, devolution of regula-
tory authority under the CWA has not had an auspicious track
record.  The thought that more authority may move to the states
is even more troubling, as Steinzor’s data demonstrate.66
This record alone might be sufficient cause for concern, but the
fact that the EPA has rarely withdrawn state delegated authority
on its own initiative, or at the request of environmental groups,
makes matters worse.67  Quite simply, the EPA lacks the re-
sources and political will to compel the states to perform at a
level necessary to protect the environment.
It is easy to understand the EPA’s reluctance to let the con-
gressional hammer fall.  There would be an enormous political
firestorm should such an action occur.68  Requiring the agency to
take over administration of the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program would also pre-
sent a huge drain on already limited federal resources.69  And, in
63 See  Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 382, 388-96.
64 Id.  at 382-99.
65 Id.  at 399-419.  Steinzor’s conclusions are based on an analysis of data from
seventeen states that looks at population size and distribution, land area, overall
economic capacity, and resources devoted to environmental and natural resources
programs, and that characterizes the environmental challenge each state faces.
66 Dwyer, however, argues that while the states had a poor record before enact-
ment of basic environmental laws, that record has improved considerably.  Dwyer,
supra  note 15, at 1223.  He ascribes that improvement to the centralization of envi-
ronmental policy beginning in 1970, which gave states both a “model” for their own
legislation and “a springboard for innovative regulation that goes beyond the federal
minimum.” Id .
67 See , e.g. , Steve Cook, EPA Returns Control of Air Permit Program to Maryland
After Legislature Amends Law , 34 ENVTL. REP., Jan. 24, 2003, at 180; see also
Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1199-1216 (describing the EPA’s unsuccessful struggle to
get the states to implement land use and transportation controls and its tepid en-
forcement efforts against recalcitrant states regarding state inspection and mainte-
nance programs).
68 Partial Withdrawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Part 70 Operating Permits
Programs in California; Announcement of a Part 71 Federal Operating Permits Pro-
gram, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,551 (Oct. 15, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70).
69 See  Melnick & Willes, supra  note 39, at 246 (noting that “revocation of state
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the last analysis, the EPA remains dependent on local expertise
and acceptability for these programs to work.70  The states all
know of the EPA’s reluctance to withdraw programmatic author-
ity, so there is no real federal pressure on states to meet federal
requirements, leaving citizens as the only antidote.
Assuming, therefore, that the need for citizen enforcement of
environmental laws like the CWA is escalating in importance, the
prospect that the Court’s expansionist view of the Eleventh
Amendment might extend to environmental citizen suits is of
grave concern.71  This is because states, which are playing an
even more central role in the administration of these laws, are
still either unwilling, or severely hampered in their ability, to ad-
minister them vigorously and have no need to fear federal over-
sight.  It is to the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
that this Article now turns.
III
THE SUPREME COURT’S ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE (IN BRIEF)
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is surprisingly clear and
brief given how far afield from the text the Court has wandered,
and how much controversy its application has engendered.  It
provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”72  In
enforcement authority [under the CAA] would not be wise because states do per-
haps seventy to ninety percent of all enforcement of the CAA”).
70 See generally  Dwyer, supra  note 15.
71 See  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1553-54 (“Especially in an age marked by at least a
rhetorical commitment to devolution, decentralization, and more equal intergovern-
mental cooperation, such a hierarchical, nonconsensual approach to state compli-
ance with federal law cannot be expected as the most likely federal response to
Alden .”).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  The Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia , 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1783), which held that Article III had abrogated any preexisting immu-
nity the States might have had, allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a
private lawsuit against the State of Georgia to collect a debt, led to the swift adop-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment reversing that holding. See  John Randolph Prince,
Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual
Infidelity , 104 DICK. L. REV. 1, 20, 22 (1999) (saying Chisholm  is important because
it “remind[s] us of what the Constitution meant to the Founding generation before
the Eleventh Amendment was enacted” and that is, “that a broader concept of im-
munity was not implicit in the Constitution at all”).
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a relatively short time, the Court has untethered the Eleventh
Amendment from this text.  As Justice Kennedy said in Alden v.
Maine , “[t]he Eleventh Amendment confirmed, rather than es-
tablished, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it fol-
lows that the scope of the States’ immunity from suit is
demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fun-
damental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”73
Over the years, the Court has found license in this language to
apply the Amendment to suits brought to enforce federal man-
dates74 in federal court against states by citizens of the same
state,75 to suits in state , not just federal courts,76 and in federal
administrative  adjudicatory proceedings.77  At the same time as
73 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999). See  Ernest A. Young, Alden v.
Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure , 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1616
(2000) (commenting on the Court’s opinion in Alden , and stating that “nothing in
the Amendment itself really bears on the case.  Nor does the Court’s opinion seri-
ously suggest any other textual ground for the decision.  In other words, the Court
saw no need to ground its decision in any constitutional text.”); see also  Ellen D.
Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and
Printz, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (1998) (suggesting that “[t]he Court’s repeated
departures from the [Eleventh] Amendment’s language when construing its scope
suggest that the [J]ustices, including the Court’s most ardent textualists, may deem
the Amendment’s text unpersuasive evidence of the framers’ intent”).
74 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials for violations of state
law.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding
Ex parte Young  doctrine inapplicable to a suit brought against a state official to
compel his compliance with state law, and saying “it is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law”).
75 In Hans v. Louisiana , the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment confirms
principles of state sovereign immunity that are embedded in the constitutional struc-
ture and thus bars citizens from bringing suits in federal court against their own
state.  134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).  The Eleventh Amendment now also bars suits brought
by Indian tribes, Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), and by foreign
countries, Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).  The Court has additionally
extended the immunity for states beyond suits “in law or equity” to cover suits in
admiralty. See , e.g. , In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (casting aside the
tradition of viewing admiralty suits as distinct from those brought “in law and eq-
uity”); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828).
76 Alden , 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes a
state from private lawsuits brought in its own courts under federal law).
77 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); see also  R.I.
Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 39 (2002) (holding, among other
things, that the Eleventh Amendment provided no barrier to applying sovereign
immunity principles to administrative adjudications, and saying that “[t]he federal
government cannot effectively negate sovereign immunity simply by shifting the ad-
judication of private claims against non-consenting states to administrative fora”);
Kathryn J. Gainey, Note, Does Sovereign Immunity Bar Administrative Proceedings
Pursuant to Federal Environmental Statutes , 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 227 (2003)
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the Court has broadened the reach of the Eleventh Amendment,
it has curtailed Congress’s ability to abrogate that immunity.78  It
has also limited the circumstances when a state will be found to
have waived its immunity,79 or a litigant to raise successfully an
Ex parte Young80 exception to state immunity.81  The Court’s
(examining the effect of South Carolina State Ports Authority  on environmental
whistleblower proceedings brought by public employees against state agencies). But
see  Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. OSHA, 356 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment does not prevent OSHA from investigating an administrative
complaint filed by a state employee whistle-blower).
78 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding Congress cannot ab-
rogate a state’s immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers).  Although Con-
gress can abrogate a state’s immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied by legislation and the legislative means adopted to that
end. Id . at 59.  Further, the law must be based on a sufficient legislative record to
demonstrate to the court that there is a large wrong or evil that Congress can law-
fully act to correct—i.e., there must be a history of “widespread and persisting depri-
vation of constitutional rights.” See  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997) (requiring congruence and proportionality between the injury and the legisla-
tive means); see also  Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
374 (2001) (holding Congress did not validly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in
the Americans with Disabilities Act because the legislative record did not contain
clear evidence of a pattern of past constitutional violations by the states); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (noting that although the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act contains a clear statement of congressional intent to ab-
rogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress exceeded its authority under the
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination or design a congruent or proportional rem-
edy); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank , 527 U.S.
627, 633 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act was not a section 5 enact-
ment). But see  Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977, 1984
(2003) (finding that the Family and Medical Leave Act satisfied the “congruence
and proportionality” test and, therefore, was appropriate prophylactic legislation).
79 See  Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (saying the
“test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court
jurisdiction is a stringent one”).  Statutory, even constitutional provisions, merely
allowing a state to sue, or be sued, in its own courts are insufficient to waive the
state’s immunity from suit in a federal forum. Coll. Sav. Bank , 527 U.S. at 676;
Atascadero , 473 U.S. at 241; Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing
Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). But see Coll. Sav. Bank , 527
U.S. at 675-76 (stating that a federal court will find a waiver of immunity, if the state
“voluntarily” invokes jurisdiction).
80 Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (finding the Eleventh Amendment
no bar to suits brought against state officials, in their official capacity, for prospec-
tive injunctive or declaratory relief designed to remedy ongoing violations of federal
law); see also  Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 648
(2002) (authorizing suit seeking injunctive relief against Maryland public service
commissioners in their official capacity). But see  Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Trea-
sury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (barring suits brought only against state offi-
cials when “‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest’”).
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vague and overly broad rationales for protecting states from pri-
vate lawsuits—to prevent affronts to the dignity  of the states82
and to preserve essential  state functions83—could easily be con-
strued to cover a wide range of putative threats to states implicit
in just about any lawsuit.
The Court has also made clear that Eleventh Amendment im-
munity extends beyond the states to “arms or instrumentalities”
81 See , e.g. , Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 287-89 (1997) (de-
clining to apply the Ex parte Young  doctrine to a claim by Tribe that federal law
gave the tribe beneficial ownership of the submerged lands and banks of Lake
Coeur d’Alene, and holding that although a request for prospective relief from an
allegedly ongoing federal law violation is ordinarily sufficient to invoke “the Young
fiction,” the case was unusual because the lawsuit was the “functional equivalent of
a quiet title implicating special sovereignty interests”); Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at
74-75 (stating that the Ex parte Young  doctrine does not apply when there is a
preclusive congressional remedial scheme); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668
(1974) (holding that federal courts cannot order state officials to remedy past viola-
tions of federal law by paying funds out of the state treasury given that such relief “is
in practical effect indistinguishable . . . from an award of damages against the
State”).
82 See Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 58 (“Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely
in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s
treasury,’ it also serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); see also  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 751 (1999)
(noting that states “retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty”
and saying the Eleventh Amendment protects the states’ ability “to govern in accor-
dance with the will of their citizens”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (holding that limit on federal judicial power is
an essential element of constitutional design, as immunity “accords the States the
respect owed them as members of the federation”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (making it clear that its decision was driven by
the indignity to which a state is subject when a federal court orders state officials to
conform their conduct with state laws).  For a much earlier iteration of the state
dignity rationale, see Ex parte Ayers , 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“The very object and
purpose of the eleventh amendment [sic] were to prevent the indignity of subjecting
a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private par-
ties.”). But see Verizon , 535 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., concurring) (finding it “neither
prudent nor natural” to see a federal court’s review of a state’s determination of a
question of federal law “as impugning the dignity of the State or implicating the
States’ sovereign immunity in the federal system”); see also NOONAN, supra  note 1,
at 52-54.
83 Coeur d’Alene , 521 U.S. at 287-88 (holding that an Indian tribe is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment from seeking injunctive relief in federal court in a suit to
establish title to land); see also Alden :
A power to press a State’s own courts into federal service to coerce the
other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to turn the State
against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery
of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals.
527 U.S. at 749.
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of the state (i.e., state departments and agencies), where the state
is the real party in interest.84  The lower courts have interpreted
this extension broadly,85 sweeping in most state agencies that
might run afoul of a federal environmental mandate.86  The key
question—whether any liability imposed against the state,
through its agency, will require public funds to be paid from the
state treasury—has direct bearing on any civil penalties that a
successful environmental litigant might collect from a misbe-
84 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997); see also P.R.
Aqueduct , 506 U.S. at 142-47 (applying the Cohen  collateral order doctrine to a
territorial agency as an “arm” of the State); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub.
Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987) (stating that absent a waiver, neither a State nor
agencies acting under its control may “be subject to suit in federal court”).
85 To determine if a state agency qualifies as an instrumentality of a state, courts
look at various criteria, such as: (1) “whether any money judgment would be satis-
fied out of state funds”; (2) “whether the [agency] performs central governmental
functions,” “may sue or be sued,” or has “power to take property in its own name or
only the name of the state”; and (3) whether the agency has a corporate structure.
See , e.g. , Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1992)
(utilizing this “multi-factored balancing test” to determine that California school dis-
tricts are “state agencies” entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in federal court); Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty. Technical Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1439
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that courts, in determining whether an agency is the alter
ego of the state, will typically look at the degree of local autonomy and control the
agency has and whether funds to pay any award will come from the state treasury);
see also  Whalin, supra  note 6, at 215-19 (describing the various criteria different
circuit courts use to determine whether an agency is an arm of the state).
86 At least for now, the Court has sustained the tradition, established in Lincoln
County v. Luning , 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890), that Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not extend to cities or counties. Accord  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 n.10 (2001) (holding that
counties and municipalities do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lake
County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979)
(same). See Cheri Gochberg, Note, Environmental Enforcement After  Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 343, 365 (1997) (advocating
that federal agencies exercise their discretion to sue cities, counties, and municipali-
ties because they are “in charge of operating and maintaining many potential
sources of pollution, such as waste disposal and sewage treatment plants”). But see
Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 850-51 (identifying as “unfinished business” for the Court
“whether the states and local governments should be treated equally for purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment”).  The Court has also left open the question whether
Eleventh Amendment immunity stretches to interstate compact commissions or offi-
cials.  Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 n.20, 51 (1994) (hold-
ing Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to a regional authority, even
though there is “no ‘per se  rule [precluding the application of the Eleventh Amend-
ment] when States act in concert’”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But
see  Souders v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 48 F.3d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Compact
did not waive WMATA’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to a nuisance suit chal-
lenging noise levels).
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having state.87
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars federal court juris-
diction over an action against a state official acting in his or her
official capacity.88  Usually, but not always, suits for injunctive
and/or declaratory relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment under the application of the Ex parte Young  doctrine.89
Regardless if one subscribes to the “diversity explanation” (the
Amendment does no more than require a narrow construction of
the state-citizen diversity clause in Article III) or to the “prohibi-
tion theory” (the Amendment bars federal court jurisdiction) of
the Amendment’s intent,90 the Court considers that the Amend-
ment “sufficiently partakes” of subject matter jurisdiction to en-
able a state to assert it as a defense for the first time on appeal.91
87 See , e.g. , Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 29 (1981)
(“In no case, however, have we required a State to provide money to plaintiffs much
less required a State to take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome obliga-
tions,” as the structural relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case.); Thomson v. Har-
mony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1319 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the University of Cincinnati is
a state instrumentality and, therefore, amenable to suit in the Ohio Court of Claims,
and that the hospital is an agency of the university that is entitled to immunity from
suit in federal court); MSA Realty Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding, among other things, that the Eleventh Amendment bars a claim for injunc-
tive relief that would require direct payments by a state from its treasury for the
indirect benefit of a specific entity).
88 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984); accord
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57
(2d Cir. 1999).
89 See , e.g. , Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423
(9th Cir. 1996) (allowing suit for prospective relief under the CWA); Powder River
Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding Eleventh
Amendment did not bar suit alleging the attorney fee provision in Wyoming’s sur-
face mining statute violated the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act because
suit sought prospective, rather than retrospective, relief); MSA Realty Corp ., 990
F.2d at 295 (holding, among other things, “that the eleventh amendment [sic] bars a
claim for injunctive relief . . . that would require direct payments by the state from
its treasury for the indirect benefit of a specific entity”). But see , e.g. , Manning v.
S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1990) (barring
suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act by a landowner seeking a declaration that
his rights were violated under South Carolina condemnation statutes because issu-
ance of declaratory judgment would have the same effect as a full-fledged award of
damages).
90 See  Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 848 (discussing both theories and determining
that under either, the text of the Eleventh Amendment “does not bar a suit by any
plaintiff except an out-of-state or foreign citizen, does not bar a suit not brought in
law or equity, and does not bar any suit brought in state court”).
91 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment defense sufficiently partook of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that
it could be considered even though it was not raised in the district court by Illinois
state officials).
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To a large extent the Court’s federalism jurisprudence,92 of
which its Eleventh Amendment decisions are a part, reflects the
thinking of those in Congress and the Administration who sup-
port devolution of federal regulatory authority to the states. This
is particularly troubling since the commonality of thinking on this
issue decreases the already slim likelihood that Congress would
undertake any corrective action should the Court decide to
shield the states from citizen suits brought to enforce federal
mandates.93  Yet, other than generally critical scholarly com-
ments94 and dissenting Justices,95 this construction of a glass wall
92 The other prongs of this jurisprudence can be found in the Court’s decisions
restricting the reach of the Commerce Clause, see  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 565-68 (1995) (holding that Congress does not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit the possession of firearms in the vicinity of schools),
and expansion of the Tenth Amendment. See  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
934-35 (1997) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the United States from
compelling a state to enact legislation to implement a specific regulatory scheme);
accord New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
93 Tarlock says that the three foundational premises for environmental law in this
country are now partially unraveling.  These principles are: (1) courts should be
open to suits by nongovernmental organizations challenging the “failure of federal
and state agencies to consider adequately the environmental consequences of their
actions”; (2) the need “to federalize environmental protection to the maximum ex-
tent possible”; and (3) the application of “state-of-the-art-plus technology” can solve
most environmental problems.  While all of these “objectives succeeded beyond the
wildest expectations of the pioneering architects of environmental protection” and
“remain the foundation of modern environmental law,” he argues they are “insuffi-
cient to sustain environmental law in the twenty-first century.”  Tarlock, supra  note
57, at 611.
94 See , e.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1429 (1987) (criticizing the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for
“clumsily attempting to hammer legal devices for abused citizens into doctrinal de-
fenses for abusive governments”); Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 858 (criticizing the
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for having “cleared away the text of
the Eleventh Amendment”); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdic-
tion Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction , 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34
(1983) (saying that the Court’s treatment of the Eleventh Amendment “as prohibit-
ing federal courts from taking jurisdiction over suits brought in federal court against
a state by private citizens” is “mistaken”); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compro-
mise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity , 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (declaring that the “Court’s
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity case law deserves the condemnation
and resistance of scholars”); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence: State Sover-
eign Immunity and the Denationalization of Federal Law , 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 691
(2000) (criticizing the Court’s decisions in Alden , College Savings Bank,  and Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board , as “blows for government nonac-
countability and the preeminence of the fiscal interests of the states over the
supremacy of federal law” and “curtailing the substantive reach of Congress’ powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment”); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
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around the states from citizens seeking to vindicate federal man-
dates has proceeded largely unnoticed, and its potential impact
on environmental citizen suits was, until recently, largely
unexamined.96
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of  Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
495 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, Potential Evisceration] (generally criticizing the ef-
fect of Seminole Tribe  on the Ex parte Young  doctrine); Vicki C. Jackson, The Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity , 98 YALE L.J.
1, 3-13, 3-4 (1988) (criticizing the Court’s interpretation of sovereign immunity in
Hans  as textually unwarranted and fundamentally at odds with two bedrock consti-
tutional principles: that “The law will generally provide a remedy for rights violated
by the government . . . and that the judicial power of the United States over claims
arising under federal law is as broad within its sphere, as is the legislative power of
the United States”); David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What Good Is Federalism? ,
31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 757, 759 (2000) (calling the Court’s Seminole Tribe  decision
“Rosemary’s Baby,” and criticizing the Court’s 1999 trilogy for being “neither good
federalism nor a sign of moderation”); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Eleventh Amend-
ment Schizophrenia , 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 861 (2000) (stating that “the
increasing prominence of the state sovereignty strain in the Court’s opinions may
suggest that the Court is poised to reject or narrow some of the alternative mecha-
nisms for enforcing the federal obligations of the states”); Young, supra  note 73, at
1604 (criticizing the majority’s use of what the author calls “big ideas”
structuralism).
95 See , e.g. , Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996).  In his dissent,
Justice Souter declared:
In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, the Court today holds for the first time since the founding
of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State to the
jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a fed-
eral right.
Id .
96 This is not to say that the topic has been completely unexamined. See , e.g. ,
Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1516 (assessing the effect of Seminole Tribe  and Alden  on
federal environmental law and concluding that “private environmental lawsuits
against states in state court can go forward at least to the extent that they are cast as
Young suits,” but noting that Alden  continues to pose some problems); Gochberg,
supra  note 86 (examining restrictions placed on enforcement of environmental laws
by Seminole Tribe); Margo Hasselman, Note, Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n and the
Unfortunate Limitation of Citizen Suits Against the State in Cooperative Federalism
Regimes,  29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (2002) (analyzing Bragg  and briefly examining its
effect on private environmental lawsuits under the CAA and CWA); Markus G.
Puder & John A. Veil, The Discrete Charm of Cooperative Federalism: Environmen-
tal Citizen Suits in the Balance , 27 VT. L. REV. 81, 112 (2002) (analyzing Bragg  and
concluding that “the train of thought offered in the decision has the potential to
undermine the entire system of citizen litigation involving federally approved state
programs”); Reynolds, supra  note 45, (examining the Court’s decision in Seminole
Tribe  and the extent to which it has placed in doubt statutory language waiving the
state sovereign immunity in favor of citizen enforcement); Whalin, supra  note 6 (ex-
amining the implications of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on dis-
crete issues under the Clean Water Act; the Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; and takings; as well as
citizen suits against states under delegated authority); cf.  Abate & Cogswell, supra
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IV
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COURT’S ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND
ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON
CWA CITIZEN SUITS
State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is not abso-
lute. There are three exceptions to that immunity: (1) congres-
sional abrogation; (2) state waiver; and (3) the Ex parte Young
doctrine.97  The prevailing wisdom is that the Court’s state sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence does not apply to the CWA, or to
other pollution control statutes that employ a cooperative feder-
alism model.  This thinking is largely based on footnote 17 in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida ,98 which suggests that section 505 im-
plicitly authorizes suits against states under the third exception—
the Ex parte Young  doctrine.99  Unfortunately, citizen suits under
the CWA and its kindred statutes may be vulnerable to an Elev-
note 14 (arguing for a cabined sovereign immunity doctrine against the federal sov-
ereign in the context of citizen enforcement of federal environmental law); Gainey,
supra  note 77 (discussing the impact of Federal Maritime Commission v. South Caro-
lina State Ports Authority  on the federal administrative proceedings involving a
state’s compliance with environmental laws).
97 A fourth argument some environmental plaintiffs have tried in their efforts to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment is that the United States is the “true” plaintiff
in any citizen suit enforcement proceeding and that citizens are merely standing in
the shoes of the government—i.e., that the complaint is in the nature of a qui tam
action.  At least one circuit court has given this argument short shrift.  See Burnette
v. Carothers , which held that “there is no common law right to maintain a qui tam
action.”  192 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts
Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1972)).  The CWA, the Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) neither give citizens the right “to sue on
behalf of the United States nor establish a formula for recovering civil penalties.  To
the contrary, the citizen suit provisions authorize ‘any citizen to commence a civil
action on his own behalf.’” Id . (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). Cf . R.I. Dep’t of Envtl.
Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 43 (2002) (applying the same principle to ad-
ministrative proceedings).
98 517 U.S. at 97 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate a state’s immunity
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers).
99 See id.  at 75 n.17 (distinguishing the Clean Water Act from the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act because the former does not contain a remedial scheme that would
be less expansive than that which is imposed under the Ex parte Young  doctrine).
See also Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n , which held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred a citizen suit that sought to enjoin the Director of the West Virginia Division
of Environmental Protection for violating his nondiscretionary duties under the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).  248 F.3d 275, 294 (4th Cir.
2001).  Unlike the CWA, state, not federal law was implicated in the lawsuit and,
therefore, the Ex parte Young  doctrine did not apply. Id .
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enth Amendment defense,100 despite footnote 17, because of
how the lower courts have narrowed the reach of that
doctrine.101
Before discussing the Ex parte Young  exception, it is worth
briefly looking at how the Court has constrained the other two
exceptions to state sovereign immunity (abrogation and waiver)
to put the Ex parte Young  doctrine into the broader context of
the Court’s overall Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Such a
review shows that the Court has substantially narrowed each of
these exceptions, virtually shutting whatever window of opportu-
nity for CWA citizen suits against states they might otherwise
have offered.  These decisions increase the likelihood that the
100 For example, the Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions have all but fore-
closed CERCLA private cost recovery and contribution actions brought against
states. See  Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. C3990, 1992 WL 88165, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1992) (disallowing plaintiff’s claims under CERCLA against individual
state officials under the Ex parte Young  exception precisely because the plaintiff’s
remedies under CERCLA are limited to damages claims); see also  Araiza, supra
note 7, at 1529 (commenting that a lawsuit seeking changes in how a state adminis-
ters its CAA state implementation plan (SIP) could be interpreted as implicating the
“autonomy and integrity of the state’s regulatory authority as to in effect enjoin the
state itself” and be barred under the Eleventh Amendment).  Although Araiza con-
cludes that, after Alden , such a suit could probably go forward, the possibility after
Bragg  that a SIP could be considered state law throws that conclusion into question.
Id.  at 1530. See also  Hasselman, supra  note 96, at 227-28 (noting the facial similar-
ity between the federalism structure in the SMCRA and the CAA). But see  Clean
Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment did not bar suit under the CAA, alleging state officials failed to
implement fully motor vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M) program mandated
by state implementation plan, saying among other things that the state did not have
a “special sovereignty interest” in the design of its I/M program).
101 A related area of concern that is beyond the scope of this Article is the lower
federal courts’ use of the Burford  abstention doctrine, which allows federal court
dismissal where adjudication would involve complicated questions of state law, or
would interfere with a state’s attempt to develop a regulatory scheme.  Although
federal appellate courts have only addressed suits challenging permitting or siting
decisions under the RCRA, district courts have applied the reasoning more broadly
to RCRA citizen suits generally.  For a critical review of this trend, see generally
Charlotte Gibson, Note, Citizen Suits Under the Resources Conservation and Recov-
ery Act: Plotting Abstention on a Map of Federalism , 98 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1999).
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bragg  that state, not federal law is at issue in a
citizen suit under a delegated regulatory program may have the additional result of
increasing what might otherwise have been considered at least questionable uses of
the Burford  abstention since a federal statutory scheme will no longer be at issue in
such suits. See id.  at 284-85 (explaining that courts that have dismissed RCRA suits
based on the theory that they involve only local law have done so under two theo-
ries, one of which is based on the claim that “once the EPA has authorized a state
program to operate ‘in lieu’ of RCRA’s federal regulations, the issues at stake . . .
become local matters suitable for abstention”).
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Court might consent to a similar narrowing of the Ex parte
Young  exception by the lower courts.  Because neither abroga-
tion nor waiver holds out much promise for CWA litigants, they
are discussed in summary fashion below, followed by a more
comprehensive discussion of the Ex parte Young  doctrine.
A. Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment and
State Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. Abrogation
Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity provided
that it expresses its unequivocal intention to do so in the stat-
ute,102 and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional author-
ity.103  A review of the case law on both of these prongs reveals
that abrogation is unavailing as a theory under which a CWA
citizen suit against a state could proceed, despite section 505’s
specific authorization of such suits.
As to the first prong of congressional abrogation, the clarity of
congressional intent required, the Court has said that “[a] gen-
eral authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of une-
quivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.  When Congress chooses to subject the States to
federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.”104  There seems to
be near-unanimity at the circuit level that the language found in
section 505 of the CWA (and in so many environmental laws) is
not sufficiently unequivocal as to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment,105 and, in fact, reveals that “the Eleventh Amendment re-
102 Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 55 (requiring a “clear legislative statement” of an
intent to dispel sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985) (holding that Congress must make its intent to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity “unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
ute”); accord  Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); see also  Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (calling this “a ‘simple but stringent test’”).
103 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); see also  Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 55.
104 Atascadero , 473 U.S. at 246.
105 See , e.g. , Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d. Cir. 1999) (finding the
citizen suit language in the CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA does not “unequivocally
express Congress’s intent to abrogate sovereign immunity and subject states to
suit”); see also  Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court properly dismissed all claims under
the CWA against the state agency on Eleventh Amendment grounds). Compare
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club, 959 F. Supp. 422, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
aff’d , 182 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 1999) (RCRA citizen suit provision operates within the
Eleventh Amendment) and  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)
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tains some presumptive force.”106
With regard to the second prong, the validity of Congress’s ex-
ercise of its abrogation power, the CWA is again in trouble.  It is
generally assumed that Congress exercised its Commerce Clause
power when it enacted the statute.107  In Seminole Tribe , the
Court declared that the Commerce Clause is no longer a valid
constitutional basis for congressional abrogation of a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity.108  At the moment, only the en-
forcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment (section 5)
remains as a constitutional basis for congressional abrogation.109
Therefore, it appears unlikely that Congress abrogated the Elev-
(finding the provisions of CERCLA unmistakably express Congress’s intent to
divest the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity).
106 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (E.D. Wis. 1998); see also  R.I. Dep’t.
of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 42 (2002) (finding no provision in the
Safe Drinking Water Act that “remotely purports to abrogate the states’ immunity,”
and construing the law’s citizen suit provision as indicating “that Congress had no
intention to disturb the states’ traditional immunity from suit”).
107 But see  Houck, supra  note 9, at 683-86 (arguing that the General Welfare
Clause provides a more compelling basis for environmental laws than the Commerce
Clause); see also  Steinzor, supra  note 10, at 364-65 (noting that “environmental fed-
eralism might well have developed on a more stable, less confusing foundation” if
Congress had invoked the principle of protecting public health under a general fed-
eral police power, rather than the Commerce Clause).
108 517 U.S. at 59; accord  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (“Seminole Tribe  makes clear that Congress may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers . . . .”); Al-
den , 527 U.S. at 754 (“In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of
the Constitution . . . the States retain immunity from private suits in their own
courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legisla-
tion.”); see also  Jackson, Potential Evisceration , supra  note 94 (generally criticizing
the effect of the Court’s ruling on the Ex parte Young  doctrine, and arguing the task
ahead for the Court is overruling the case); Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 854-57 (argu-
ing states should not be immune for their actions when they are engaging in com-
mercial behavior, and thus Union Gas  should be reinstated).
109 Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 65-66; see also  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (noting that the Court
has recognized individual suits against nonconsenting states only when authorized
by Congress’s valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (acknowledging the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis for abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Burnette , 192
F.3d at 59.  The Burnette  court rejected an argument that CERCLA’s authorization
of claims for recovery of response costs created a protectable property right under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying “Congress’s creation of a private
claim for damages does not, without more, give rise to a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment.  To hold otherwise would eviscerate Seminole.” Id .  The court also noted the
need to determine “‘whether the prophylactic measure taken under purported au-
thority of § 5 . . . was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’” Id . at 60 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank , 527 U.S. at 675).
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enth Amendment in the CWA.110
2. Waiver
State waiver as a basis for exposing a state to liability can simi-
larly be disposed of quickly.  As noted previously, a state can
waive its immunity to suit by consenting to be sued.  In determin-
ing whether a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, a court will look to see if the waiver is unequivocal either by
virtue of the express language of the statute or by such over-
whelming implication from the text as to leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.111  A state cannot constructively
waive its sovereign immunity.112  Therefore, merely participating
in a regulatory program by accepting delegated authority will not
qualify as consent.113  Nor will the acceptance of federal funds
110 See Froebel , 13 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (saying, after Seminole , “the abrogation
claim for an environmental statute such as the CWA appears difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to maintain” and concluding that section 505 fails both Seminole  tests, “though
not without troubling implications for environmental citizen suits in general”). See
also  Mich. Peat v. EPA, 175 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding the CWA did not
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in a suit brought under section 404, and that the
action could not be maintained under the Ex parte Young  exception); cf. Rowlands,
182 F.3d at 918 (reaching the same result under RCRA); Burnette , 192 F.3d at 57;
Froebel , 13 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51 (listing some of the affected environmental laws).
111 See  Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir.
2001) (“If Congress is not unmistakably clear and unequivocal in its intent to condi-
tion a gift or gratuity on a State’s waiver of its sovereign immunity, we cannot pre-
sume that a State, by accepting Congress’s proffer, knowingly and voluntarily
assented to such a condition.”); see also  Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar enforcement of a consent de-
cree against a state even though the violations of the decree were not violations of
federal law, because the decree springs from a federal dispute, furthers the objec-
tives of a federal law, and was accepted by the state when it asked the district court
to approve its decree; and declining to address the argument that the State had
waived its immunity in the course of litigation).
112 Coll. Sav. Bank , 527 U.S. at 680 (expressly overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry .,
377 U.S. 184 (1964), and saying that since any waiver of a constitutional right must
be examined stringently, constructive waiver has “no place” in sovereign immunity
jurisprudence); accord Burnette , 192 F.3d at 60 (saying the state did not construc-
tively waive its sovereign immunity by engaging in an activity regulated by Congress
because “the law is now clear that a state cannot “constructively waive[ ] its sover-
eign immunity”). But see Coll. Sav. Bank , 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(saying if Congress has the power to create “substantive rights,” it must also have
the “subsidiary power” to create private remedies to enforce them).
113 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 298 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding the
language in the citizen suit provision of the SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2), requir-
ing states to submit to federal jurisdiction was not an “‘unequivocal’ warning” that
the states participating in the law’s regulatory scheme waived their immunity).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 33  1-NOV-04 13:35
Effect of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits 79
constitute a waiver of a state’s immunity.114  Thus, courts will not
infer from a state’s participation in a delegated federal regulatory
program or acceptance of federal funds for the administration of
that program a waiver of the state’s immunity.
The lower courts that have addressed the issue of waiver in
section 505 find the language authorizing suits by citizens to en-
force the law’s substantive provisions unpersuasive on the issue
of waiver.  In fact, two federal circuit courts have interpreted
those provisions not only as not expressing Congress’s intent to
waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, but, similar to abroga-
tion, as actually preserving a state’s sovereign immunity.115  Thus,
waiver offers a poor avenue for citizens seeking to enforce fed-
eral mandates under the CWA against states in the face of an
Eleventh Amendment defense.
B. The Ex parte Young Doctrine
The Court in Ex parte Young  held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar suit against a state official acting in violation
of federal law.116  Although often termed a legal fiction,117 the
doctrine is based on the unassailable premise that a state cannot
authorize its officials to violate the Constitution and the laws of
114 Compare Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon , 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985)
(“[T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to
suit in federal court.”) with Doe v. Nebraska , 345 F.3d 593, 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that Nebraska agreed to waive its sovereign immunity to suit under the
1973 Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds for its foster care and adoption
programs).
115 See , e.g. , Bragg , 248 F.3d at 298 (“Far from expressing Congress’ clear intent
that participating States waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, this language [SM-
CRA § 1270(a)(2)] actually preserves a State’s sovereign immunity.”); accord Bur-
nette , 192 F.3d at 57 (finding that citizen suits under section 505 of the CWA were
“expressly limited by the Eleventh Amendment”).
116 Ex parte  Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (The state official is “stripped of
his official character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his indi-
vidual conduct.  The State has no power to impart to its officer immunity from re-
sponsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.”).
117 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (calling the Ex parte
Young doctrine a fiction to the extent it distinguishes between a state and an officer
acting on the state’s behalf, but one that is necessary to maintain the balance of
power between state and federal governments) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985)). See  Eric B. Wolff, Comment, Coeur d’Alene and Existential Catego-
ries for Sovereign Immunity Cases , 86 CAL. L. REV. 879, 912-14 (1998) (criticizing
the Court for addressing all sovereign immunity claims with an oversimplified ana-
lytical rule instead of looking to legal traditions and “existential categories” as sug-
gested by Professor Jaffe and Justice Scalia).
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the United States.118  Thus, such an action is not considered an
action of the state and cannot be shielded from suit by a state’s
immunity.119  Therefore, when this doctrine applies, a state of-
ficer can be sued in his individual capacity for violating a
mandatory federal duty.120
Footnote 17 in Seminole Tribe  suggests that section 505 implic-
itly authorizes suit under Ex parte Young .121  However, a combi-
118 See  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (say-
ing the Ex parte Young  doctrine is necessary “to permit federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible ‘to the supreme authority of the
United States’”); see also  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (saying “‘since Ex
parte Young  . . . it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield
for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal
right under the color of state law.’”) (citation omitted).  If such a suit is successful,
the state officer may be held personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
based upon actions taken in his official capacity. Id.  at 30-31.
119 Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 102.  A state official subject to Ex parte Young  can raise
as a defense the lack of direct authority, or practical ability, to enforce the chal-
lenged statute. See , e.g. , Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (holding “any probe into the existence of a Young  exception should gauge (1)
the ability of an official to enforce the statute at issue under his statutory or constitu-
tional powers, and (2) the demonstrated willingness of the official to enforce the stat-
ute”) (emphasis added); accord  Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 1998);
Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding “Young  does not apply when a defendant state official has neither
enforced nor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute”); see
also  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (2002) (declining to read addi-
tional “ripeness” or “imminence” requirements into Ex parte Young  beyond those
imposed by Article III and a prudential ripeness analysis, and holding suit barred
against the Governor and State Secretary of Resources because there was no show-
ing of the requisite enforcement connection, but allowing suit against the Director of
the California Department of Fish & Game because he had direct authority over,
and principal responsibility for, enforcing the law at issue).
120 While a court lacks authority to prevent a state official from performing a dis-
cretionary function, an injunction prohibiting a state official from doing something
she has no legal right to do is not an interference with that official’s discretion. Ex
parte Young , 209 U.S. at 150; see also  Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (applying Ex parte Young  to allow suit against state
regulatory commissioners); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996)
(noting the opinion leaves open alternative means to ensure states comply with fed-
eral laws, e.g., “an individual can bring suit against a state officer to ensure that the
officer’s conduct is in compliance with federal law”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.
v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (noting Ex parte Young  “ensures
that state officials do not employ the Eleventh Amendment as a means of avoiding
compliance with federal law”).
121 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (comparing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
§ 7410(d)(7) with other statutes where lower courts have found that Congress im-
plicitly authorized suit under Ex parte Young , including 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)); see
also  Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir.
1996) (saying, since “Congress intended to encourage and assist the public to partici-
pate in enforcing the standards promulgated to reduce water pollution,” it would be
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nation of Supreme Court and lower court decisions interpreting
the reach of Ex parte Young  has narrowed the doctrine in ways
that may deprive environmental litigants of its benefits.122  Four
of the ways in which federal courts have narrowed the effective-
ness of Ex parte Young  as a shield against an Eleventh Amend-
ment motion to dismiss are discussed below.  These include the
scope of the doctrine, the nature of relief a court may award both
as to its scope and type, and the character of the law under which
suit has been brought.  Again, while each of these restrictions has
significance for prospective environmental plaintiffs, it is the
fourth that has the greatest import and is, accordingly, discussed
in the most detail below.
1. The Scope of the Doctrine—the Special Sovereignty Interests
of the State
The Court’s decision in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe  limits the
reach of the Ex parte Young  exception in a narrow class of cir-
cumstances—namely, where the relief requested would implicate
special sovereignty interests  of the state.123  In that case, the plain-
tiff sought to shift all beneficial ownership and control over sub-
merged lands from the State to the Tribe.  The Court termed the
suit “unusual” in that it was the functional equivalent of a quiet
title action, yet one that went well beyond the typical stakes in
reasonable to conclude that it “implicitly intended to authorize citizens to bring Ex
parte Young  suits against state officials with the responsibility to comply with clean
water standards and permits”); cf.  Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding the Ex parte Young  exception allows suits to enjoin continuing violations of
the ESA take prohibition); accord  Pacific Rivers Council v. Brown, 2002 WL
32356431 (D. Or. Dec. 23, 2002) (allowing a citizen suit against a state forester for
violating the ESA by approving clearcut logging operations in watersheds that con-
tain coho salmon, where the requested relief was prospective, the alleged violations
of the ESA were “fairly traceable” to the state forests, the state would not be
divested of jurisdiction over state lands, and where plaintiff’s action is not barred by
Seminole Tribe).
122 See Coeur d’Alene , 521 U.S. at 270 (commenting that the exceptions to the Ex
parte Young  doctrine demonstrate that application of the doctrine must entail more
than “a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction” . . . such “empty formalism” would
improperly sacrifice the “real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment”); Bell
Atl. Md. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[J]ust because a
private citizen’s federal suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against State officials
does not mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under an exception
to the Eleventh Amendment protection.”).
123 See Coeur d’Alene , 521 U.S. at 261, 296 (holding that the Ex parte Young  doc-
trine does not apply “[w]here a plaintiff seeks to divest the state of all regulatory
power over submerged lands . . . . [I]t simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit
against the State.”).
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such an action.124
It is probably safe to assume, as the district court did in Swartz
v. Beach ,125 that suits to enjoin state-authorized illegal discharges
are not changing the nature of the state’s ownership of the sub-
merged lands, and, therefore, do not fall within an interpretation
of Coeur d’Alene  that limits the effect of the decision to those
circumstances.126  What is not so clear is whether a suit claiming
that a state was not properly implementing  a federal environmen-
tal statute implicates the integrity and autonomy of a state’s reg-
ulatory authority as to, in effect, enjoin the state itself from
acting in a certain way, and thus runs afoul of the holding in
Coeur d’Alene .127
124 Id.  at 282-83; see also Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Raney, 199 F.3d 281, 290 (5th
Cir. 2000) (finding that a tribe had “not sufficiently distinguished” its own case from
a quiet title action); MacDonald v. Village of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 972 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding that a challenge to public use of a right of way that provided public
access to a navigable waterway implicated special sovereignty interests); ANR Pipe-
line Co. v. LaFaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Kansas’s special
sovereignty interests were implicated under the Tax Injunction Act because granting
plaintiff prospective relief would, in effect, divest Kansas of its power to assess and
levy personal property taxes, and saying “a state’s interests in the integrity of its
property tax system lies at the core of the state’s sovereignty”).  The ANR Pipeline
court also found that the relief requested by the plaintiff was the functional
equivalent  of a money judgment against the state, and for this additional reason
intruded on the state’s special sovereignty interests and was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id . at 1189.  For a narrower reading of the Coeur d’Alene  holding, see
Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine,  87
GEO. L.J. 1, 49 (1998) (reading “the Court’s disquisition on the special nature of
submerged lands” as suggesting that the Coeur d’Alene  exception to the Ex parte
Young  doctrine “extends only to disputes over sovereignty over such lands”).
125 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1256 (D. Wyo. 2002) (finding the regulation of coalbed
methane discharge water under the CWA does not implicate special sovereignty in-
terests).  In Swartz , the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the individual
state defendants had taken his private property in violation of the Constitution by
issuing a discharge permit that increased the salinity of vegetation on his ranch, and
sought to enjoin the state from allowing this to happen.
126 See  Vasquez, supra  note 124; see also Swartz , 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (finding
that the regulation of coalbed methane discharge water under the CWA “does not
implicate special sovereignty interests because Plaintiff’s requested relief would not
change the nature of the State’s ownership and regulation of the ephemeral
stream”); Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 854 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (concluding
that while an action under the CWA implicates a state’s sovereignty interest in its
navigable waters, the average CWA claim will “not amount to the expansive and
permanent incursion on [state] sovereign interests” implicated in the “relief sought
in Coeur d’Alene”).
127 See  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1529-30 (raising this question with respect to suits
challenging a state’s implementation of its SIP, but noting that both Edelman  and
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 37  1-NOV-04 13:35
Effect of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits 83
2. The Nature of the Relief Requested
The Court has constricted in two ways the type of relief a pri-
vate litigant can get when she sues a state under Ex parte Young .
The first concerns the extent to which Congress has constrained
the remedy that a court may grant for a violation of a statutorily
created right.128  The effect of this line of cases on the application
of the Ex parte Young  doctrine to CWA citizen suits seems mini-
mal.  The second restriction limits a litigant’s relief to that which
is prospective and does not require any expenditure from the
state’s public funds.129  While somewhat constricting, this limita-
tion does not create a fatal barrier to the doctrine’s use by CWA
litigants.
a. The Scope of Remedial Relief
In Seminole Tribe , the Court found that Congress had speci-
fied in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) the means to
enforce the duty imposed on Florida that was the basis of the
tribe’s suit.130  The Court concluded that the “quite modest set of
sanctions” (the power of a court to issue an order directing the
state to negotiate or submit to mediation and to order that the
Secretary of the Interior be notified) in the law displayed an in-
tent by Congress not to provide the “more complete and more
College Savings Bank rejected the argument that a state’s immunity hinged on the
character of its action).
128 See  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (“[W]here Congress has
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statu-
torily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young .”); see also
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 525 U.S. 635, 647 (2002) (finding the
1996 Telecommunications Act places no restrictions on the relief a court can award,
and therefore Seminole Tribe  is inapposite).
129 See , e.g. , Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v.
Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945).  However, an ancillary effect on
a state treasury, as a result of compliance with a court decree which by its terms is
prospective in nature, may be “permissible and [is] often an inevitable consequence
of the principle announced in Ex parte Young.” Edelman , 415 U.S. at 668 (citation
omitted) (discussing Graham v. Richardson , 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in which Arizona
and Pennsylvania welfare officials were estopped from denying welfare benefits to
otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens, and Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254
(1970), in which New York welfare officials were enjoined from authorizing the ter-
mination of benefits paid to welfare recipients without a prior hearing).
130 See  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (defining the state’s duties under the IGRA), and
§ 2710(d)(7) (describing the means by which those duties were to be enforced).  The
Court described § 2710(d)(7) as intending “not only to define, but also to limit sig-
nificantly, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3).” Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 74.
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immediate relief” that would otherwise be available under Ex
parte Young .131  Therefore, a court allowing suit under Ex parte
Young , in the case of the IGRA, would be inconsistent with the
detailed and limited remedial scheme that Congress had pre-
scribed to enforce the state’s statutory duty to negotiate.132 Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine should not apply in that circumstance.
The question raised by Seminole Tribe  is whether the CWA con-
stitutes a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme so as to preclude
the application of Ex parte Young  to a citizen suit brought to
enforce its provisions against a state.
The answer to this question is assisted to some extent by the
Court’s own dicta in Seminole Tribe  finding the CWA distin-
guishable from the IGRA on exactly this point, and stating that it
“[did] not hold that Congress cannot  authorize federal jurisdic-
tion under Ex parte Young  over a cause of action with a limited
remedial scheme,” only that Congress did not intend that result
in the IGRA.133  The word coming out from the circuit courts on
this question is similarly encouraging.  For example, in Penn-
sylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs , the Third Circuit
found that, with respect to the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act’s (SMCRA) remedial scheme, there was no clear
expression by Congress of what the remedies should be other
than a takeover of the state program by the federal regulatory
agency or suit in federal court, and, therefore, the law was
neither detailed nor limited.134  When coupled with the language
131 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75.
132 Id.  at 74. But see  Jackson, Potential Evisceration , supra note 94, at 510-30
(arguing the reasoning of Seminole Tribe  rests on the mistaken assumption that Ex
parte Young  affords a free-standing remedy that is somehow broader than a statu-
tory enforcement scheme).
133 Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 75 n.17; see also  Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d
843, 853-54 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (commenting that the Court’s dicta in Seminole Tribe
saved it from having to consider “the relative complexity of the CWA’s remedial
scheme as directed at the states”). But see  Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (finding no implied remedy under
the CWA based upon its extensive remedial scheme).
134 Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 331 (3d Cir. 2002) (say-
ing “the question is whether the scope of the statutory remedy Congress established
displaces the ‘default option’ of an Ex parte Young  suit,” and finding that the SM-
CRA does not prescribe such a scheme).  In Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas , 256 F.3d
281, 309 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held that the
RCRA, with its explicit reference to the Eleventh Amendment and its sim-
ilarity to the CWA, [is] precisely the sort of statute envisioned by the Semi-
nole Tribe  Court to authorize an Ex parte Young  action.  Far from
demonstrating Congress’s intention to bar access to Ex parte Young , the
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in that law’s citizen suit provision that such suits are explicitly
allowed to the extent provided by the Eleventh Amendment, the
argument for allowing such suits to go forward became even
clearer to that court.135  The only court to date faced with this
question under the CWA agreed with the Third Circuit’s reason-
ing and found the Act did not contain a limited remedial scheme
as understood in Seminole Tribe .136  Since, in most cases, citizens
seeking relief under laws like the CWA are not seeking a wider
range of remedies than those prescribed by the laws under which
they are suing,137 this restriction of Ex parte Young  should not
pose a problem.
RCRA embraces the Ex parte Young  doctrine as a feature of its remedial
scheme.
Cf.  Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 862 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the
single remedy provided under the Medicaid Act of cutting off funds if a state pro-
gram does not meet federal requirements is not a detailed remedial scheme suffi-
cient to show Congress’s intent to preempt an action under Ex parte Young , and
contrasting this single remedy with the “timetables, incentives, and ‘intricate proce-
dures’” in the IGRA); Joseph A. v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act did not provide remedial schemes sufficient to foreclose Ex parte
Young  jurisdiction because the statutes did not provide for remedies more limited or
materially different than available under Ex parte Young); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939-40 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding section
252 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which provides aggrieved parties with a
private cause of action, was not precluded by Seminole Tribe’s  limitation on the Ex
parte Young  doctrine); Md. Psychiatric Soc’y, Inc. v. Wasserman, 102 F.3d 717, 719
n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an assertion that the Medicaid Act’s remedial scheme is
sufficient to invoke the rule of Seminole Tribe); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163
F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding 42 U.S.C. § 1988 did not contain a detailed
remedial scheme designed to limit or prevent potential remedies that a court might
order).
135 Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs , 297 F.3d at 331.
136 Swartz v. Beach , 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1255 (D. Wyo. 2002) (relying on the
Court’s acknowledgment in Seminole Tribe  footnote 17 that the language in section
505 of the CWA allowing citizen suits “to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment” evidences congressional intent to provide litigants with remedies tra-
ditionally available under the Ex parte Young  doctrine).
137 See  Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. 3990, 1996 WL 596546, at *16 (finding
Seminole Tribe  did not block a RCRA lawsuit where the plaintiff simply sought “to
obtain injunctive relief in accordance with RCRA’s own provisions”); see also
Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1535-36 (suggesting that the more general citizen suit autho-
rizations found, for example, in the CWA, should survive in either federal or state
court, as the type of relief authorized is not limited, “but instead implicitly provides
the court with the full panoply of equitable [Ex parte Young] powers necessary to
‘enforce’ the law”). But see  Whalin, supra  note 6, at 239 (arguing that “since all of
the federal environmental statutes allow the United States the discretion to bring an
action against a state entity for enforcement,” even the theoretical existence of this
remedy precludes the use of Ex parte Young).
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b. Prospective, Not Retroactive Relief
The second way the Court has restricted the Ex parte Young
doctrine is to limit the relief a litigant can get to that which is
prospective and does not require payment of funds from the state
treasury.138  While imposing some limitations on the effective-
ness of a CWA citizen suit, as discussed below, the Court’s inter-
pretation of the doctrine does not prevent that suit from being
brought because the jurisdictional requirements of section 505
(and of most citizen suit provisions) allow suits only for ongoing
violations.139  Thus, litigants seeking injunctive relief  under the
CWA have successfully deployed Ex parte Young  in suits against
states.140
138 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984); see
also  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981); Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1994) (finding that because the Au-
thority was the product of a bi-state compact, payment of liabilities for torts it com-
mitted would not come from the states’ treasuries, and, therefore, the Eleventh
Amendment was not implicated); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (up-
holding the lower court’s determination that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suit to compel future state compliance with federal standards for processing welfare
applications, but that the Eleventh Amendment does bar an injunction ordering ret-
roactive payment of previously owed benefits); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (In determining whether Ex parte Young  applies, a court need
only conduct a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospec-
tive.”). But see Hess , 513 U.S. at 58-61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
exposure of the state treasury to liabilities, while a “sufficient condition ,” was not a
“necessary” one; rather the proper inquiry was whether the “State possesses suffi-
cient control  over an entity performing government functions that the entity may be
properly called an extension of the State itself”).
139 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57
(1987) (holding that section 505’s language requires citizen-plaintiffs to “allege a
state of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood
that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future”); see also  Araiza, supra
note 7, at 1538 n.124 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 108-
09 (1998), as putting into question granting of injunctive relief in a “‘one-shot viola-
tion’ situation”); Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1538 (suggesting that Steel Co. ’s limitation
on the availability of injunctive relief when combined with the significant role retro-
spective relief could play in redressing environmental violations means “Alden ’s fi-
nal closing of the door to retrospective relief looms even larger”). But see  Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Friends of the Earth
cast a cloud over Steel Co .’s holding, with the Court saying that Steel Co . merely
held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to
assess penalties for wholly past violations, but our decision in that case did
not reach the issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are
ongoing at the time of the complaint and that could continue into the fu-
ture if undeterred.
Id . at 188.
140 See , e.g. , Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423
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However, “the difference between the type of relief barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte
Young  will not in many instances be that between day and
night.”141  This ambiguity may have significance for CWA suits
where the remedy may as easily be to correct a past, albeit ongo-
ing, violation (such as removing an illegal wetland fill) as it is to
prohibit future illegal conduct.142  Further, the law is also not
clear as to whether the doctrine allows declaratory relief , a form
of relief frequently sought by CWA litigants.143
Additionally, not only can citizens not recover civil penalties
(9th Cir. 1996) (allowing claims to proceed seeking prospective injunctive relief
against the Director of the California Department of Transportation for violations of
a CWA permit); Comm. to Save the Mokelumne River v. East Bay Util. Dist., 13
F.3d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit
against members of the California Regional Water Control Board for prospective
injunctive relief under the CWA). But see  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1531 (saying,
after Coeur d’Alene , it is clear that “even some types of prospective relief against
states will be unavailable and the unavailable relief might well include injunctions
requiring a state to take a particular regulatory or enforcement course”).
141 Edelman , 415 U.S. at 667.
142 But see  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1539-40 (finding Ex parte Young  posed a prob-
lem not only for CERCLA’s cost recovery or contribution remedy, but also for the
only type of injunctive relief available under the law, which would be “mooted”
either by the cleanup having been completed or by the fact that the EPA had or-
dered the plaintiffs to do the work—exactly the situation which led to the Court’s
late-departed decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.).
143 See  Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) (holding “the issuance of a de-
claratory judgment . . . would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of
damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being . . . pro-
hibited by the Eleventh Amendment”); Natural Res. Def. Council , 96 F.3d at 423
(disallowing claims for declaratory relief against the Director of the state Depart-
ment of Transportation for past violations of the CWA). But see  Verizon Md. Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. , 535 U.S. 635 (2002).  The Court recognized that Ver-
izon’s prayer for declaratory relief “seeks a declaration of the past , as well as the
future , ineffectiveness of the Commission’s action,” but found no past liability of the
state, or of any of its commissioners, at issue, nor a risk of “‘a monetary loss result-
ing from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials.’”
Id . at 646 (quoting Edelman , 415 U.S. at 668 (1974)).  Therefore, “insofar as the
exposure of the State is concerned, the prayer for declaratory relief adds nothing to
the prayer for injunction.” Id .  The Court also listed cases in which injunctive relief
against state regulatory commissioners had been approved at the circuit court level:
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis , 307 F.3d 835, 848 (2002) (holding plaintiffs’ request
for declaration that a state law is preempted by federal law and cannot be enforced
by state officials against federal trapping efforts in the future is purely prospective
and is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians v. Hardin , 223 F.3d 1041, 1045-49 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Ex parte Young
exception to declaratory relief against state board of equalization); and Balgowan v.
New Jersey , 115 F.3d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction to hear Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim for declaratory relief against state commissioner
under Ex parte Young  exception).
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against a state under Ex parte Young , a basic remedy in most
CWA citizen suits,144 but there may also be a problem if the exe-
cution of an injunction requires a state to expend funds or dis-
pose of state property.145  However, all of these problems with
using the Ex parte Young  doctrine pale in severity when com-
pared with the question of whether a citizen suit brought under a
delegated federal regulatory program is seeking to enforce fed-
eral or state law.
3. The Characterization of the Law Under Which Suit
Has Been Brought
Potentially, the most debilitating interpretation of the Ex parte
Young  doctrine comes not directly from the Supreme Court, but
144 See Friends of the Earth , 528 U.S. at 185-88 (recognizing the deterrent value of
public fines); see also  Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for David’s Sling: Civil Penal-
ties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities , 2 J. ENVT. L. & LIT. 1 (1987)
(discussing among the values of civil penalties their obvious deterrent effect).  There
is also an obvious stigma effect associated with civil penalties, which can provide an
additional incentive for a recalcitrant government agency.
145 See Edelman , 415 U.S. at 663 (reciting the rule that “a suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state trea-
sury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); see also  Larson v. Domestic & For-
eign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949) (holding Ex parte Young
exception does not apply if injunctive relief cannot be granted by merely ordering
cessation of the conduct complained of, but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property); Ford Motor Co.
v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (stating that “when the action
is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,
substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from
suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants”); Fletcher, supra  note
2, at 847 (commenting on the “intrusiveness of affirmative injunctions” and wonder-
ing if “there may be some danger to the continuation of an unqualified Ex parte
Young  principle under the current Supreme Court’s jurisprudence”). But see
Edelman , 415 U.S. at 667-68 (“[T]he fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these
[injunctive relief] cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which
by their terms were prospective in nature . . . .  Such an ancillary effect on the state
treasury is a permissible and often inevitable consequence of the principle an-
nounced in Ex parte Young .”); Mokelumne River , 13 F.3d at 309-10 (finding action
against members of state water quality board not barred by Eleventh Amendment
even though it requested costly remedial action to remove and dispose of contami-
nated sediments); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1974) (considering
Larson  footnote as only barring suit in exceptional cases, where to do otherwise
would impose “‘an intolerable burden on government functions, outweighing any
consideration of private harm’”); Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (E.D.
Wis. 1998) (saying “Schlafly  is still good law” and that it is “echoed by the prevailing
rationale in [Coeur d’Alene],” and pointing out the “irony . . . that compliance with
injunctive orders properly issued under Ex parte Young  will often have dramatic
fiscal consequences for states”) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68
(1970)).
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from circuit courts applying Supreme Court precedent—in par-
ticular, from their application of the Court’s decision in Pen-
nhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II) .146
Pennhurst II  holds that citizens cannot sue state officials in fed-
eral court for violations of state law, regardless of the nature of
relief sought.147  The question Pennhurst II  raises for potential
environmental litigants is whether a claim made under a dele-
gated federal regulatory program is asking a federal court to en-
force federal or state law against a state.  The Fourth Circuit, in
Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association , answered that question
by saying under the SMCRA it is unquestionably state law.148
The Bragg  court’s answer has serious implications not only for
citizen suits under the SMCRA, but, because of the similarities
between the federalism structures of the SMCRA and other pol-
lution control laws, potentially for suits brought under those
146 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Pennhurst II  involved a class action brought by mentally
retarded adults against Pennhurst Hospital claiming that the hospital did not provide
adequate rehabilitation services required under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4201 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and that conditions at the Hospital violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 92.
The Third Circuit, ruling only on state grounds, found a violation of the state statute
and ordered state officials to accommodate the needs of the class. Id.  at 93-94.  The
Supreme Court then overturned the Third Circuit’s decision, saying that a federal
court could not order state officials to change their hospitals pursuant to a state law
that gave those same officials broad discretion, even if the officials had erred in the
exercise of that discretion. Id.  at 107-10.  The Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars a suit challenging a mistake made by a state official in the course of exer-
cising his discretionary authority under a state law, declaring that the purpose of the
Ex parte Young  doctrine was to “permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights
and hold state officials responsible to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”
Id.  at 105.
147 Id.  at 106.
148 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); accord  Pa. Fed’n
of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding the Eleventh
Amendment barred a citizen suit alleging that the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s De-
partment of Environmental Protection (PDEP) failed to maintain an adequate rec-
lamation bonding system as required by the state’s approved surface mining
program because the claims were based on state, not federal law; the state’s surface
mining program was not incorporated into federal law; and the PDEP Secretary had
no federally imposed duty to implement the state’s program); see also  W. Va. High-
lands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (holding
the Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit against the Secretary of the West
Virginia Division of Environmental Protection for violating the SMCRA’s perma-
nent bonding requirements because “federal law is subsumed in the approved state
program and, even where inconsistent with federal law and disapproved by OSM
[the federal Office of Surface Mining], must be enforced as state law, absent affirma-
tive OSM action” withdrawing the program).
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laws, including the CWA.149
The facts in Bragg  involved a federally approved state surface
mining program, which authorized West Virginia to promulgate
mine operation and reclamation standards, and to issue, as well
as enforce, permits.150  The Fourth Circuit found this program
was state law, not federal law, because the version of “coopera-
tive federalism” employed in the SMCRA provides “extraordi-
nary deference to the States .”151  The Bragg  court based its
conclusion on what it called the unique structure of the SM-
CRA—a structure which calls for the federal government to
“hand over to the States the task of enforcing minimum national
standards . . . providing only limited federal mechanisms to over-
see State enforcement.”152  According to the Fourth Circuit, the
SMCRA calls for either state regulation of surface coal mining
within its borders or federal regulation, “but not both.”153  The
statutory federalism of the SMCRA, therefore, was “quite unlike
the cooperative regime under the Clean Water Act.”154  The
Fourth Circuit’s errors in reaching this conclusion are startling.
First, the Bragg  court took language out of context appearing
in section 503 of the SMCRA that directs states wishing “to as-
sume exclusive jurisdiction” over the regulation of surface mining
to submit a state program to the Secretary for his approval.155  In
149 See  Hasselman, supra  note 96, at 224-29 (criticizing the Bragg  decision for
misconstruing the SMCRA and misapplying Supreme Court precedent, and com-
menting that if the rationale in the case is widely adopted or extended to other
environmental statutes, it could cripple the ability of citizens to hold state regulators
accountable for their environmental regulatory obligations under other cooperative
federalism laws like the CAA and CWA); see also  Puder & Veil, supra  note 96, at
91-93 (analyzing the Bragg  decision and addressing legal and political questions
raised in its “wake” in the “context of the decision’s broader cooperative federalism
theme”).
150 SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (setting out the elements of a state
program); see also Bragg , 248 F.3d at 294.  “[B]ecause of the diversity in terrain,
climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining
operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, is-
suing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations sub-
ject to this chapter should rest with the States.” Id .  (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f)
(2000)).
151 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 293 (emphasis added).
152 Id.  at 293-94; accord Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs , 297 F.3d at 318 (explain-
ing that “this ‘either-or’ arrangement illustrates why, as the Bragg  court observed,
the regulatory structure is not quite cooperative  federalism—SMCRA does not pro-
vide for shared regulation”).
153 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 293.
154 Id.  at 294.
155 30 U.S.C. § 1253(1)(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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emphasizing and isolating the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction,”156
and finding in it a basis to distinguish the SMCRA from other
cooperative federalism laws like the CWA, the Bragg  court ig-
nored the many indicia of residual federal authority in states with
“regulatory primacy.”157  For example, the SMCRA preempts
any state law that is weaker than the comparable federal stan-
dard.158  Not only are mining activities in a state with an ap-
proved regulatory program subject to direct federal
enforcement,159 but the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) can
enter and inspect any mine, at any time, in any state with an ap-
proved regulatory program in order to evaluate that state’s ad-
ministration of its program.160  Further, OSM can enforce any
part of a state’s regulatory program if it finds that the state is
doing an inadequate job,161 and can replace the entire state regu-
latory program with a federal program if the state fails to “imple-
ment, enforce, or maintain its approved State program.”162  Once
in place, a federal program automatically preempts any state law
156 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 294.  It is worth noting that this phrase appears nowhere
else in the statute and is used in § 1253(1)(a) merely to introduce a set of detailed
requirements for states intending to seek delegated regulatory authority from the
federal government.
157 Id.  at 289 (explaining a state’s “primacy” status as “status under which its law
exclusively regulates coal mining in the State”).
158 SMCRA § 505, 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000).
159 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000).
160 SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (2000).  An inspector has a duty to no-
tify the state regulatory authority of any violations she finds in a state with an ap-
proved regulatory program, and must wait ten days, unless there is an imminent
danger of significant environmental harm, before proceeding.  SMCRA § 521(a), 30
U.S.C. § 1271 (2000).
161 SMCRA § 504(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (2000); see also  SMCRA § 505(a), 30
U.S.C. § 1255(a) (providing that no state law or regulation in effect on the date of
the law’s enactment “shall be superseded . . . except” to the extent it is “inconsistent
with the provisions of [the] Act”); DK Excavating Co. v. Miano, 549 S.E.2d 280, 285
(2001) (holding state surface mining laws inconsistent with the SMCRA were not
enforceable as state law pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1255(a)); W. Va. Highlands Conser-
vancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).  Unless the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reconsiders DK Excavating  or the U.S. Supreme Court
overrules it, the controlling state decision recognizes that the
federal regulatory prong of SMCRA preempts inconsistent and inadequate
state law, while Bragg , the controlling federal decision, holds ‘our federal-
ism’ commits regulation of state-adopted SMCRA programs, however in-
adequate and inconsistent with federal law, to West Virginia alone unless
and until federal revocation proceedings are initiated by the Secretary of
the Interior.
W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 478 n.5.
162 SMCRA § 504(a), 30 U.S.C. 1254(a)(3) (2000); see also W. Va. Highlands Con-
servancy , 147 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81, n.9.  The court in West Virginia Highlands Con-
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that interferes with its implementation.163
Second, in its eagerness to emphasize the SMCRA’s “ex-
traordinary deference to the States,”164 the Bragg  court failed to
see the state features in cooperative federalism laws such as the
CWA, despite specifically distinguishing that law from the SM-
CRA.  For example, like the SMCRA, the CWA provides for the
delegation to states of permitting, inspection, enforcement, and
standard-setting authority,165 and for suspension of the federal
permitting program upon submission of an approved state pro-
gram.166  Also, like the SMCRA, the CWA authorizes states to
adopt and enforce any standard or pollution abatement require-
ment that is equal to, or more stringent than, its federal counter-
part.167 Thus, the indicia of reserved federal authority and
“extraordinary deference” to states are apparent in both laws,
and there simply is not the sharp distinction between the two
laws that the Fourth Circuit implies in Bragg .168
servancy  listed other instances of overriding federal authority in the SMCRA, and
stated
This Court is unable to reconcile (1) Section 1255 preemption, (2) OSM’s
explicit finding that the West Virginia alternative bonding system did not
meet the objectives of SMCRA, (3) partial  disapproval of state programs
by OSM under Section 1253, (4) Section 1271 provisions, and (5) Molinary
with our Court of Appeals’ account of SMCRA cooperative federalism.
Nevertheless, as a faithful servant of the law, the undersigned must apply
strictly the law as proclaimed by the superior tribunal.
Id. Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co. , 125 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1997) held
that the exclusive regulatory  jurisdiction provided for in §§ 1253(a) and 1254(a) does
not encompass exclusive adjudicatory  jurisdiction.
163 SMCRA § 504(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (2004).
164 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 293 (4th Cir. 2001).
165 CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2004).
166 CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2004).  Other parts of the CWA contain
comparable provisions for delegation of federal permits for the discharge of dredged
or fill material into navigable waters and protection of state sovereignty. See  33
U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(k), (t) (2004).
167 CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2004).
168 The Bragg  court points to section 101(f) of the SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f),
as proof that Congress’s choice of a state regulatory primacy structure was “careful
and deliberate.”  248 F.3d at 294.  Yet, when this language is compared to the direc-
tion contained in section 101(b) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2004) (stating it is
“the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . .  and to
implement the permit programs under sections 1242 and 1344”), one has to wonder
which law, the SMCRA or the CWA, tilts the balance more towards the states. See
also  CWA § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (granting states exclusive jurisdiction to
allocated quantities of water within their jurisdiction, and saying those rights “shall
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired” by the statute).
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Third, in its effort to distinguish away the CWA, the Bragg
court misinterpreted what the Supreme Court said, and did, in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma ,169 mistakenly relying on that case as
proof that the CWA “‘effectively incorporate[d]’  State law into
the unitary federal enforcement scheme, making State law, in
certain circumstances federal law,” unlike the SMCRA.170  The
Court in Arkansas , however, specifically declined to address the
question whether the CWA required the EPA to apply the down-
stream state’s water quality standards precisely because the per-
mit involved was a federal permit issued under section 402(a) of
the CWA,171 and not under a delegated state regulatory program
(section 402(b)),172 inferring that the answer might be different if
it were a section 402(b) permit.173  Further, somewhat ominously
in light of Bragg , the Arkansas  Court noted that Congress in
crafting the CWA protected certain state sovereign interests,
what the Fourth Circuit in Bell Atlantic Maryland  referred to as
“islands of state sovereignty,”174 citing as an example section 510,
which “allows [s]tates to adopt more demanding pollution-con-
trol standards than those established under the Act.”175
According to Bragg , in giving states “exclusive regulatory con-
trol through enforcement of their own  approved laws, Congress
intended that the federal law establishing minimum national
standards would ‘drop out’ as operative law and that the State
laws would become the sole operative law.”176  The adoption of
169 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
170 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 294.
171 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
172 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
173 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).  It is true that EPA regulations
require NPDES permits to comply with the applicable water quality requirements of
all affected states.  40 C.F.R. 122.4(d).  This requirement “effectively incorporates
into federal law those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines to be
‘applicable.’” Arkansas , 503 U.S. at 110.  However, as the Bragg  court points out,
that is not the end of the story.  248 F.3d at 294.  As the Court in Arkansas  notes,
only those state standards the EPA has approved and determined to be applicable
are incorporated into an NPDES permit, and states promulgate water quality stan-
dards with substantial guidance from the EPA.  503 U.S. at 110.  Another feature of
the case was that it involved interstate water pollution, which the Court has long
recognized to be controlled by federal law, giving the upstream state’s standards “a
federal character.” Id.
174 Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc. , 240 F.3d 279, 300 (4th Cir. 2001)
(describing how the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “partially flooded the existing
statutory landscape with specific preempting federal requirements, deliberately leav-
ing numerous islands of State responsibility”) (emphasis added).
175 Arkansas , 503 U.S. at 107.
176 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 295; see also  Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Hess, 297
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federal minimum standards by a state as part of a federally ap-
proved state regulatory program, therefore, means that any vio-
lation of those standards, even if the state standard is exactly the
same as the federal standard, involves state, not federal law.177
An injunction from a federal court against state officials would
be commanding them to comport with the state’s own laws, and
not with federal law, because only the state law is operative and
directly regulates the issuance of permits.178  Any such command
to a state is “so abhorrent to the values underlying our federal
structure as to fall outside the bounds of the Ex parte Young  ex-
ception.”179  To construe the SMCRA’s statutory federalism de-
sign as allowing citizens to enforce the statute’s national
minimum standards against state officials, therefore, would end
exclusive state regulation and undermine the federalism estab-
lished in the Act.180
F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2002) (making short work of plaintiff’s argument that the
Pennsylvania surface mining regulatory program, with its Pennsylvania-specific stan-
dards, has been incorporated, or “codified” into federal law by virtue of its appear-
ance in the Code of Federal Regulations).
177 Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs , 297 F.3d at 324, leaves a slight opening for suit
in federal court under an approved regulatory program, if the challenged element of
the approved state program is inconsistent with—i.e., less stringent than—the fed-
eral requirements.  A challenge of this type would, however, add an additional ele-
ment of proof to the claim of what otherwise would have entailed only a showing of
the violation.
178 But see  Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 256 F.3d 281, 308 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding
plaintiffs alleged violations of federal, not state, law when they sued state officials
for allowing an open dump in violation of section 4003 of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6943, and, therefore, Pennhurst  did not bar their lawsuit); cf.  Farricielli v. Hol-
brook, 215 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2000) (remanding to the district court the question
whether claims filed under Subchapters C and D of the RCRA were filed under
federal or state law); Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp. 2d. 705, 717 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (relying on Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Phila. Water Dep’t , 843
F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1988) for the proposition that Pennsylvania’s SIP is federal law as a
basis for holding that plaintiff’s challenge to the state’s incomplete implementation
of its I/M program raised a cognizable federal claim); accord  Citizens for Pa.’s Fu-
ture v. Mallory, 2002 WL 31845880 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2002).
179 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 296.
180 Id.  at 295-96.  The court construes the SMCRA as allowing citizen suits
to enjoin officials in a primacy State to comport with the federal  provisions
establishing the core standards for surface coal mining would end the ex-
clusive State regulation and undermine the federalism established by the
Act.  Thus, rather than advancing the federal interest in preserving this
statutory design, Bragg’s interpretation would frustrate it.
Id.  at 295.  In support of this conclusion, the court notes that, while minimum na-
tional federal standards drive the law, there is no evidence in the statute of Con-
gress’s desire to implement those standards directly, nor did it “invite the States to
enforce federal  law directly.” Id.
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that the federal interests in the
SMCRA are stronger than those at issue in Pennhurst II  because
the federal rights under the SMCRA “were created by the state
pursuant to a federal invitation to implement a program that met
certain minimum standards set by Congress,” and because the
federal government “retains an important modicum of control
over the enforcement of that State law.”181  Nonetheless, the
court found that Pennhurst II  controlled—the federalism design
of the statute meant that the relief the citizens requested fell on
the “‘Eleventh Amendment side of the line’” between the type
of relief barred by Pennhurst II  and that permitted under Ex
parte Young  because it impaired the state’s dignity.182  According
to the court, the state’s dignity
does not fade into oblivion merely because a State’s law is en-
acted to comport with a federal invitation to regulate within
certain parameters and with federal agency approval. . . . The
West Virginia statute and implementing regulations are solely
the product of its own sovereignty, enacted pursuant to its
democratic processes, and, as was the case in Pennhurst , a
State’s sovereign dignity reserves to its own institutions the
task of keeping its officers in line with that law.183
Applying Pennhurst II  means that citizens can only enforce a
law like the SMCRA, as it is now state law, in state court absent
affirmative federal action withdrawing, or otherwise preempting,
the state program.184  However, as discussed earlier in this Arti-
cle, federal withdrawal or preemption of a delegated state regula-
tory program is highly unlikely.185  State court is not a desirable
forum for environmental litigants pursuing states, as discussed
later in this Article, because they may well encounter other
problems and jurisdictional barriers—including sovereign immu-
nity under state law.
Given the structural similarities between the SMCRA and the
181 Id.  at 296.
182 Id.  at 296-97.  For an analysis noting the significant differences between the
underlying facts in Pennhurst  and those in Bragg , see Hasselman, supra  note 96, at
223-24.
183 Bragg , 248 F.3d at 297.  The court went on to note that West Virginia law, as
required by the SMCRA, gave citizens the right to take their grievances to state
court and try there to hold the State Director accountable for any violations of the
West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act. Id.
184 Accord W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481
(S.D. W. Va. 2001). But see infra  Part V.C (discussing the problems with that
resolution).
185 Supra Part II.
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CWA, identified earlier in this Part, it is hard to see why the
Bragg  court’s de-centrist reasoning, and its application of Pen-
nhurst II , would not resonate in a CWA citizen suit against a
state.  This is not as far-fetched as one might think.  A Wisconsin
district court, in an opinion before Bragg , flagged the Pennhurst
II  issue in a citizen suit brought against two state environmental
officials for violating the CWA’s permitting provisions in a state
with delegated permitting authority.186  While noting under the
CWA’s federalism design that the EPA and state regulatory
agencies share concurrent enforcement authority over violations
of state-issued permits, the district court said that “Congress
clearly intended the states to take the leading role in issuing and
enforcing the NPDES system .”187  Although that court went on
to say that it would follow the lead of other courts that had found
jurisdiction to entertain citizen suits alleging violations of the
CWA’s permitting provisions without addressing the Pennhurst
II  question,188 it is worth wondering whether the judge would
have deferred the issue had he had the Fourth Circuit’s Bragg
decision before him.
Applying these disparate strands of the Court’s Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence to the CWA leaves one with the un-
easy feeling that citizens seeking to enforce mandatory federal
duties against states may face a formidable barrier.  Congress has
not validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in the CWA.
Quite the contrary, according to various appellate courts, the lan-
guage of section 505 explicitly preserves the Amendment’s appli-
cation, and courts are not likely to find that the states have
waived their immunity under the CWA.
With regard to Ex parte Young , while no lower court has found
186 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 844-55 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
187 Id.  at 855 (emphasis added); see also  California v. United States Dep’t of the
Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that, once approved, state programs
are administered under state law); District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854,
863 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The state courts are the proper forums for resolving questions
about state NPDES permits, which are, after all, questions of state law.”).
188 Froebel , 13 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t
of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1996)). Natural Resources Defense Council
allowed injunctive relief to proceed under the CWA against the State Secretary of
Transportation.  96 F.3d at 424.  The court in Natural Resources Defense Council
said that because Congress intended to encourage and assist the public to participate
in enforcing standards promulgated to reduce water pollution, it would be reasona-
ble to conclude that Congress “implicitly intended to authorize citizens to bring Ex
parte Young suits against state officials with the responsibility to comply with clean
water standards and permits.” Id.
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that enforcement suits brought under the CWA implicate a
state’s special sovereignty interests as implicated in Coeur
d’Alene , that question has not been raised when citizens have
challenged a state’s administration of its delegated authorities.189
Similarly, while no court has yet found that the CWA offers a
preclusive remedial scheme, environmental plaintiffs have lost
the opportunity to seek civil penalties from states, unless sought
against an individual state official in his official capacity, and
their right to some forms of injunctive relief may be open to
question.  But these problems are mere annoyances when com-
pared to the potential effect of the Fourth Circuit’s Bragg  deci-
sion on CWA citizen suits.
Assuming Ex parte Young  may not provide the shield from the
preclusive effect of the Eleventh Amendment that future envi-
ronmental plaintiffs would like, it is worth examining whether
there are alternative legal theories that might avoid the need to
raise the doctrine altogether, and what the effect might be if citi-
zens can no longer go to federal court to seek relief against state
defendants.
V
POSSIBLE WAYS AROUND THE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY BARRIER
Seminole Tribe  eliminated the Commerce Clause as a basis for
congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.190  How-
ever, under certain circumstances, section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Spending Clause, although untested, may
189 The plaintiff in Swartz v. Beach  arguably raised state programmatic concerns
when he alleged that individual state officials took his property by issuing a CWA
permit that authorized the discharge of coalbed methane (CBM) waters that dam-
aged his property and by failing to perform their statutory duty to remedy that dam-
age.  229 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (D. Wyo. 2002).  The District Court dismissed portions
of these counts to the extent plaintiff sought monetary damages against state offi-
cials in their official capacity and to enjoin them from violating state law. Id.  at
1252-53.  The court did, however, allow the request for punitive damages against
officials in their individual capacity to proceed. Id.  at 1253. The court also found it
had subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining portions of these claims under Ex
parte Young  because the CWA’s remedial scheme would not be pre-empted by the
application of Ex parte Young , and because the state’s “special sovereignty inter-
ests” were not implicated by its regulation of a “small ephemeral stream.” Id.  at
1255-56.
190 See supra  Part IV.A.1 (discussing the second prong of the abrogation excep-
tion as applied to CWA).
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provide a valid ground for congressional abrogation.191  In addi-
tion, various federal courts, which have disclaimed jurisdiction to
hear a citizen suit based on the Eleventh Amendment, have as-
sured citizens that they can either rely on the federal government
to prosecute their cause or bring the same actions in state court.
However, as discussed below, neither of these suggestions does
much to assure that either citizens will be able to navigate around
the Eleventh Amendment or that the violations they seek to rec-
tify will indeed be corrected.
A. Alternative Grounds for Congressional Abrogation
The Court has recognized section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a valid basis for congressional abrogation of the Elev-
enth Amendment.192  A citizen asserting this basis for
congressional abrogation must allege a violation of her due pro-
cess or equal protection rights or of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.193  Assertions under the Equal Protection Clause
191 The Treaty Power in the Constitution may present another basis for abrogation
of the Eleventh Amendment with respect to its application to CWA citizen suits,
assuming one can establish it as a constitutional basis for the CWA. U.S. CONST.
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See  John O’Conor, Note, Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh Amend-
ment: The Aftermath of the College Savings Cases , 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1031-40
(2000) (discussing the possibility of Congress abrogating Eleventh Amendment im-
munity by enacting legislation protecting intellectual property rights pursuant to its
Treaty Power); see also  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (sustaining legisla-
tion regulating the killing of migratory birds as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress’s authority under the Treaty Power). But see  Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties
and the Eleventh Amendment , 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 715 (2002) (saying that the
Eleventh Amendment still constrains Congress’s power to abrogate immunity when
it acts to implement a treaty).
192 See , e.g. , City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, cl. 5) (saying section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively
grants Congress the power to abrogate sovereign immunity since it was passed after
the Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (ac-
knowledging the Fourteenth Amendment provides a basis for abrogation); Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“We think that Congress may, in
determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”).  The court’s
most recent application of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity was in Tennessee v. Lane , 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1980 (2004)
(holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131,
12202) as applied to “the fundamental right of access to the courts” is a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
193 See , e.g. , F.J. “Rick” Dindinger II, Seminole Tribe’s Impact on the Ability of
Private Plaintiffs to Bring Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court , 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 253, 265-66 (1997) (suggesting environmental citizen suits brought
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have met with mixed success depending on whether they meet
the Court’s test of congruity and proportionality,194 and whether
there is clear evidence in the legislative record of a pattern of
past constitutional violations by the state.195  Because it is hard to
imagine how the Fourteenth Amendment might be implicated in
a suit to abate a violation of the CWA (other than a substantial
procedural irregularity by the state and perhaps not even then),
it seems unlikely that a claimant could meet the Court’s test of
congruence and proportionality, let alone make the necessary ev-
identiary showing required by Kimel .196  Therefore, the Four-
teenth Amendment holds out little hope as an alternative ground
for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment in a
CWA citizen suit against a state.
The Spending Clause,197 which authorizes the CWA grants that
to vindicate property interests are in some sense authorized by the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Coll. Sav. Bank ,
527 U.S. at 673 (holding the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act was not a
property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not in-
clude a right to exclude).
194 Boerne , 521 U.S. at 519-20 (putting forth the “congruence and  proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end”
as the test for determining whether a law is substantive in operation and effect, thus
exceeding the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000)
(describing the “congruence and proportionality” test utilized in Boerne  as differen-
tiating between appropriate “prophylactic legislation” and an inappropriate attempt
to effect “a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment”). But see Lane ,
124 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to this test as “flabby” because
it is “a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decision
making”).
195 See Kimel , 528 U.S. at 89 (finding the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act’s
legislative history insufficient to support congressional abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (commenting upon Congress’s failure to point to a pattern of
patent infringement by the states, “let alone a pattern of constitutional violations”);
see also  Whalin, supra  note 6, at 240 (warning the new standard of judicial review in
College Savings Bank  may provide the federal courts “with a hunting license to chal-
lenge all environmental statutes to determine whether the evidence at the time they
were enacted supported the legislation”).
196 See  Reynolds v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1107-08 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (saying the teaching of Boerne  is “there must be a substantial constitutional
hook: the principal object of the legislation must be to address rights that are judi-
cially recognized [as prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment]”); see also  Froebel
v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (finding no such “hook” in a
CWA suit brought against a state agency).
197 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress “to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”).  Al-
though states will not be considered to have waived their Eleventh Amendment
immunity by merely accepting federal funds, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon , 473
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 54  1-NOV-04 13:35
100 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
finance state regulatory programs,198 may hold out slightly more
hope around the barrier to congressional abrogation that Semi-
nole Tribe  erected.199  Courts have pretty consistently held that
federal-state cooperative programs enacted under the Spending
Clause fall within the ambit of the Supremacy Clause,200 and that
conflicting local laws must yield.201  Although the Court has held
Congress can only use this power to advance “the general wel-
fare,”202 this should not be a problem with respect to state grants
to abate water pollution, nor should the requirement that
whatever conditions Congress imposes must be related to “the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.”203
Although the Court has allowed the federal government to place
conditions on a state’s receipt of federal funds,204 it has said these
U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985), the federal government can condition the receipt of those
funds upon the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 206 (1987).  However, to be judicially enforceable, these conditions must
be explicit.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).  Ar-
guably, Congress has explicitly conditioned state program grants in the CWA to
those which finance states’ administration of their delegated authorities.  33 U.S.C.
§ 1256 (2000).  Private litigants should be able to enforce these conditions under the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g. , Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145-46 (1982) (holding
that New York’s no-cash and loss or theft rules, which precluded providing emer-
gency financial assistance to families with dependent children, conflicted with fed-
eral regulations and, therefore, were invalid under the Supremacy Clause).
198 CWA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256.
199 See  Fletcher, supra  note 2, at 853 (“If Congress acts under the Spending
Clause of Article I, specifically and clearly giving a state money in exchange for a
waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, the state’s waiver should have binding
consequence.”).
200 See, e.g. , Blum , 457 U.S. at 145-46. But see  Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725,
734 (1978) (suggesting while “federal eligibility standards are mandatory on States
that adopt . . . [a program enacted under the Spending Clause, the law] in no way
obligates a State to continue that program”).  The court in O’Brien v. Massachusetts
Bay Transit Authority , 162 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1998), held that
[I]ndividual Justices have from time to time suggested that the authority for
adhering to Federal Law when Congress employs its spending power is not
to be located in the Supremacy Clause.  But these moments have been few
and far between and . . . have not debilitated the general conclusion that
the laws of a jurisdiction that receives federal funds must, when a relevant
conflict looms, give way to federal law.
Id . at 43 n.2 (citation omitted).
201 See, e.g. , Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 516 U.S. 474, 477-78
(1996) (stating a provision of a state constitution is invalid if it conflicts with the
Medicaid Act); cf.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993)
(stating that when “a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the for-
mer must give way”).
202 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).
203 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion).
204 See  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (upholding the power of Congress
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obligations must be explicit.205  This requirement should also not
pose a problem with regard to CWA state program grants.  Con-
gress has conditioned those grants to require, among other
things, the establishment of water quality monitoring procedures
and adequate emergency and contingency plans comparable to
the authority given the EPA, as well as the filing of annual re-
ports to the EPA for approval of its state program for the preven-
tion, reduction, and elimination of pollution in accordance with
the purposes and provisions of the statute.206  However, there
may be a problem if the Court were to consider the conditions
contained in section 106 as too coercive and thus barred by the
Tenth Amendment.207
B. Federal Enforcement
The Court in Alden  found no lessening in the enforceability of
federal mandates after it had barred private enforcement in that
case because of the availability of the federal sovereign to en-
to place conditions on a state’s receipt of federal funds); see also  Jim C. v. Ark.
Dep’t of Ed., 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, and that
Arkansas waived its immunity with respect to section 504 suits by accepting federal
funds).  Dwyer comments on the potential unconstitutionality of EPA’s I/M regula-
tions under the Tenth Amendment, saying, “after South Dakota v. Dole , which ap-
pears to permit almost any conditions on federal grants to states, EPA has available
a constitutional route to the same destination.”  Dwyer, supra  note 15, at 1205 n.110
(citation omitted).
205 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
206 CWA §§ 106(e), (f), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256 (e), (f) (2000).
207 See Dole , 483 U.S. at 211 (recognizing that “in some circumstances the finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’” but refusing to hold that a conditional
grant of federal highway funds to states that establish the minimum drinking age of
twenty-one falls within that category); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925
(1997) (striking down the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act’s requirement
that state and local law enforcement officers conduct background checks of handgun
purchasers, and saying, “the Federal Government may not compel the States to im-
plement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs”); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999) (“When Congress legislates in matters affecting the
States, it may not treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corpora-
tions.”); see also  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) (“[T]he point of coercion is automatically passed—and the
voluntariness of waiver destroyed—when what is attached to the refusal to waive is
the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.”). But see  Dwyer, supra
note 15, at 1193 (commenting on the constitutional importance, with respect to the
Court’s anti-commandeering federalism decisions, of the “exit option” in environ-
mental laws for states who do not assume delegated authority).
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force them.208  But, as the dissenters noted, the likelihood of this
happening is small.209  This is certainly true in the case of enforc-
ing federal pollution control laws for the reasons given previ-
ously—limited federal prosecutorial resources and lack of
political will to enforce against the states.210
Araiza identifies the extent to which the federal government
will increase its own enforcement effort to make up the shortfall
in citizen lawsuits as a major variable in determining Alden ’s ef-
fect on state violation of federal environmental mandates.211  He
says he has an “initial suspicion” that an increase in federal en-
forcement may not be forthcoming because of the agency’s in-
creased focus on cooperation rather than deterrence in dealing
with violators, and because of the federal government’s reluc-
tance to impose penalties on state government entities—a reluc-
tance made even stronger by the fact that states are the EPA’s
main partner in the cooperative federalism scheme.212  Araiza
contrasts this reluctance with the attitude of individual plaintiffs
who have suffered injury from some violation by a state entity, or
who have a law reformer’s broader interest in environmental
protection in general.  These individuals have no reason to re-
208 See Alden , 527 U.S. at 759 (noting the availability of U.S. attorneys to sue on
behalf of the plaintiff employees); see also id.  at 755 (“In ratifying the Constitution,
the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Govern-
ment.”) (internal citations omitted); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14
(1996) (sovereign immunity is no barrier to a suit initiated by the United States,
even where the relief sought is monetary in nature); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 645 (1892) (finding the power of the federal government to bring suit against
the states necessary to “the permanence of the Union”); Whalin, supra  note 6, at
236-37 (saying absent express consent from a state to be sued, environmental plain-
tiffs only recourse is against the EPA for failing to “ensure that the state operating
under delegated authority properly fulfilled its duties,” but noting “such a suit would
be fraught with difficulties”); cf.  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1531 (noting the “irony,”
given the Court’s devolutionist tendencies, that a result of lessening the accountabil-
ity of state regulatory conduct through judicial review may be less delegation to
them).
209 Alden , 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (calling the prospect of federal
enforcement whenever private enforcement is barred by the Court’s decision “a
whimsy”).
210 Whalin adds the federal government “will use its discretion to select which
actions to bring” and that “[t]hese policy choices will reflect the viewpoint of the
administration in power” and not necessarily “the priorities of the aggrieved private
party.”  Whalin, supra  note 6, at 239.
211 Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1549; see also Alden , 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (implying the need for significant expansion in federal litigating forces).
212 Araiza, supra note 7, at 1549-52.
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frain from suing to seek penalties even against their own state.213
An additional problem with relying on only federal enforce-
ment to correct state CWA violations is that any failure of the
EPA to enforce against a polluting state facility or against a state
with an inadequately administered or enforced program will be
shielded from private suit under Heckler v. Chaney .214  While it is
true that if the EPA were to intervene in a citizen suit otherwise
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the lawsuit could continue
with the EPA as the principal party and the private plaintiffs
could intervene in the EPA’s suit,215 an intervenor carries less
weight in the ensuing litigation than a principal party.216  Thus,
having to rely on the federal sovereign to shoulder the entire
load of ensuring that states comply with the CWA’s mandates is
hardly reassuring to environmentally concerned citizens.
C. Enforcement of Federal Mandates in State Courts
Environmental litigants can also try to enforce federal man-
dates against states in state court under state law.217  Even
though it is well established that state courts can hear federal
claims,218 state laws frequently contain their own jurisdictional
213 Of course, as Araiza points out, this is exactly the type of lawsuit on which
“Alden  shuts the door.” Id.  at 1552-53.
214 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (holding an agency’s refusal to initiate an enforce-
ment action was “presumptively unreviewable”).
215 R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 45 (2002) (“If the
United States joins a private suit after it has been initiated by otherwise-barred pri-
vate parties and seeks the same relief as the private parties, this generally cures any
Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity defect, and the private parties may
continue to participate in the suit.”).
216 See, e.g. , Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974) (A
district court’s discretion, under the rule of permissive intervention, to grant or deny
application for permissive intervention “includes discretion to limit intervention to
particular issues.”); General Ins. Co. of America v. Hercules Const. Co., 385 F.2d 13,
18 (8th Cir. 1967) (“An intervenor accepts the pleadings as he finds them.”); see also
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983) (noting that “permission to intervene
does not carry with it the right to relitigate matters already determined in the case,
unless those matters would otherwise be subject to reconsideration”).
217 See  Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 297 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied ,
534 U.S. 1113 (2002).  (“Because the West Virginia courts are open to such suits, the
federal interest in maintaining the State’s compliance with its own program may be
fulfilled via suit in that forum, in a manner that does not offend the dignity of the
State.”). See also  Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and
the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs , 110
YALE L.J. 1003, 1003 (2001) (arguing state courts are a “niche” waiting to be filled
by environmental litigants who lack Article III standing).
218 See , e.g. , Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990) (find-
ing a “presumption of concurrent jurisdiction” over claims arising under Title VII
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barriers, including standing and sovereign immunity, and many
states do not offer prevailing parties fees or costs.  Further, most
state judges are elected and, thus, are more sensitive to any polit-
ical pressure that might be brought to bear on them.219 Once in
the state court system, the Rooker-Feldman  doctrine prevents
federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, from reviewing
how the state court handled the matter, making state court deci-
sions interpreting federal environmental laws virtually immune
from federal review.220  Thus, the practical realities of such law-
suits make state court a problematic venue for most citizens
seeking to vindicate federal statutory mandates.
There simply are no fail-safe alternative solutions for environ-
mental litigants should a state raise the Eleventh Amendment as
a defense to a suit brought against it for its failure to comply with
the CWA (or with any other cooperative federalism law).  This is
why the Bragg  decision and the potential ripple effect of its ap-
plication of Pennhurst  to SMCRA citizen suits are so troubling.
CONCLUSION
“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty” and established
“two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship,
despite compelling evidence of a congressional expectation of exclusive federal juris-
diction); Elmendorf, supra  note 217, at 1013. Elmendorf admits the case for concur-
rent jurisdiction over federal claims under the CWA, the SMCRA, and the CAA,
while strong, is “not airtight,” given venue clauses in each law that could be read to
signify exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id.  at 1014, 1020-21; see also  Davis v. Sun Oil
Co., 148 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding RCRA’s citizen suit provision did not
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction); cf.  Araiza, supra  note 7, at 1532 n.97 (say-
ing whether citizen suit provisions authorize suit in state court is “an important
threshold issue”).
219 See  John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The En-
vironmental Issue in State Judicial Elections , 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217 (2001) (saying
that the environment has emerged as the most prominent issue in state judicial elec-
tions, questioning the fairness and integrity of that process, and documenting the
disproportionate influence of probusiness special interests groups in the election
process); see also  Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion , 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 624-25 (1981) (speculating about the psychology
of state judges’ attentiveness to federal questions); Elmendorf, supra  note 217, at
1034 n.169.
220 The Rooker-Feldman  doctrine precludes a federal district court from exercis-
ing appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.  See District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co ., 263
U.S. 413 (1923), which collectively stand for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is
a grant of original jurisdiction and does not authorize district courts to exercise ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, which Congress has reserved to the
U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 59  1-NOV-04 13:35
Effect of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits 105
its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it.”221  The CWA, like
many environmental laws, proposed a federalism design that
maintained some semblance of balance between the two halves
of the atom.  The Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
seriously threatens that balance by potentially depriving environ-
mental litigants of a judicial remedy against a state for violation
of a federal mandate.222  In an era of heightened devolution of
regulatory responsibilities to the states, any imbalance poses seri-
ous problems for environmental plaintiffs who act as an impor-
tant corrective for failings in the devolution model.
The Fourth Circuit’s application of Pennhurst II  in Bragg  to
bar a citizen suit that otherwise would have been protected from
the Eleventh Amendment under Ex parte Young is particularly
troubling.  Given the extent to which Bragg  misapprehended the
federalism structures of the SMCRA and the CWA, the court’s
assurance that its holding will have no effect on citizen suits
brought under the CWA provides little comfort that its decentrist
reasoning will not resonate in those cases as well.223  While it is
possible environmental litigants may be able to avoid the Ex
parte Young  doctrine entirely by pursuing one of the alternative
approaches suggested in this Part, such as relying on the Spend-
ing Clause as a ground for abrogating state sovereign immunity
or on the EPA to withdraw or cabin in some way the delegation
of federal programmatic authority to a state, each of these alter-
natives has its problems.  Since there are no certain alternative
courses of action for citizens under these circumstances, unless
the Court acts to constrain the excesses of its Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence, states may be able to ignore federal environ-
221 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (quoted by Young, supra  note 73, at 1671).
222 See  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 811 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (com-
menting on the Court’s abandonment of a principle nearly as inveterate as sovereign
immunity, and much closer to the hearts of the Framers, “that where there is a right,
there must be a remedy”).
223 See  Puder & Veil, supra  note 96, at 109.  Puder and Veil note the “glaring
parallel” between SMCRA and cooperative federalism in other environmental laws,
and state that this may lead other courts to disregard
the hedging dicta offered in the Bragg  ruling, transfer the reasoning to
other environmental laws with primacy provisions, deny environmental cit-
izen litigants the Ex parte Young  exception to state sovereign immunity,
confine the review of state laws that implement a federal blueprint to state
courts, and effectively curtail federal environmental citizen suits.
Id.
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mental mandates largely without peril.224
224 For an indication that the Court might be cabining the exuberance of its Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence, see Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that state employees may recover money
damages in federal court in the event of a state’s failure to comply with the Family
and Medical Leave Act’s family care provision, and that Congress may abrogate a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it makes its in-
tention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursu-
ant to a valid exercise of power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). But
see  Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004), in which the majority limited its
finding that Title II of the ADA abrogated a state’s immunity to “the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”  In this fractious 5-4 opin-
ion, the fault lines among the Justices on the Eleventh Amendment are still evident
and may well be responsible for the cabined majority opinion. See , e.g. , id.  at 2006
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s “as applied approach” to Title
II, and finding it does not abrogate a state’s immunity because it fails the Boerne
“congruence-and-proportionality-test,” as it authorizes “private damages suits
against a State for merely maintaining a courthouse that is not readily accessible to
the disabled, without regard to whether a disabled person’s due process rights are
ever violated”; a problem made worse by “the lack of record evidence showing that
inaccessible courthouses cause actual  Due Process violations”) (emphasis added);
id.  at 2008-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying that Congress’s authority to impose
“prophylactic § 5 legislation” should be limited to those states “in which there has
been an identified history  of relevant constitutional violations,” suggesting limiting
the Boerne  analysis to congressional action under § 5 that is directed to racial dis-
crimination—all other laws must show that they “enforce” the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment—and finding that requiring access for disabled persons to
public buildings “cannot remotely be considered a means of ‘enforcing’ the Four-
teenth Amendment”); id.  at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing separately for the
sole purpose of disvowing “any reliance on Hibbs” in Rehnquist’s dissent).
